Mes - Mia


Mescall, Patrick Neil. "A Creature of Compromise: The Establishment of the DIA." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 251-274.

"[I]n the end, the JCS and the armed services won the day. Through sheer persistence they were able to mold the DIA in accordance with their desire: a real edifice built on the solid foundations of the intelligence elements of the military departments."


Messegee, J.A., et al. "Mayday for Mayaguez." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov. 1976, 93-111.

Petersen: "Participant accounts."


Messenger, Charles. The Commandos 1940-1946. London: Kimber, 1985. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. [pb]


Messenger, David A.

1. "'Against the Grain': Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1941-45." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 173-190.

In an intelligence-gathering role, "particularly as it related to economic intelligence, SOE in Spain did achieve some success and carved out a limited role for itself in assisting Britain to realize some of its aims in wartime Spain."

2. "Fighting for Relevance: Economic Intelligence and Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1943-1945." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 33-54.

In Spain, SOE was "forbidden from any involvement in direct action and sabotage.... [However,] SOE managed, over time, to find some small parts to play, most notably through intelligence gathering in connection with the Allied wolfram [tungsten] campaign.... [I]ntelligence gathering ... inevitably brought it into conflict with the Secret Intelligence Service, upon whose preserve it was trespassing."

[UK/WWII/Spain & Services/SOE][c]

Messer, Robert L.

1. The End of an Alliance: James F. Brynes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

2. "New Evidence on Truman's Decision." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Aug. 1985, 50-56.

[GenPostwar/ColdWar; WWII/FEPac/Bomb]

Messer, W. Alan. "In Pursuit of the Squared Circle: The Nosenko Theories Revisited." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 26, no. 3 (Fall 2013): 457-452.

Whatever his stated purpose, the author clearly comes on the side of Tennent Bagley's Spy Wars (2007).

[CIA/60s/Gen; CIA/Angleton/Related]

Messer, William. "Getting Space-Based ISR Data to Warfighters." Military Review, Nov.-Dec. 2001, 42-45.


Messick, Hank. John Edgar Hoover. New York: Davis McKay, 1972. [Petersen]


Meszerics, Tamás. "Undermine, or Bring Them Over: SOE and OSS Plans for Hungary in 1943." Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 2. (Apr. 2008): 195-216.

"[T]his article reconstructs the planning process [of SOE and OSS for special operations in Hungary] between March 1943 and March 1944.... The restrained rivalry between the American and British organizations was .. clearly observable in the Hungarian case.... Possibly the most persuasive explanation lies in the organizational characteristics and history of the two agencies. OSS was given a comprehensive mandate for secret intelligence, special operations, counterintelligence, and morale operations. This was an advantage over SOE, which after 1942 had to focus on sabotage and subversion alone."


Methven, Stuart. Laughter in the Shadows: A CIA Memoir. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008.

According to the publisher, the author "served in the CIA from the 1950s through the 1970s." Chapman, IJI&C 23.1 (Spring 2010), seems conflicted both by the author's approach and the book as a whole: "Surely, the operations about which Stuart Methven writes are fiction. But they are labeled A CIA Memoir. Could they then be true accounts, but written as operational allegories in which Methven participated or knew about? More likely, it is the latter. We see a telltale ring of truth in every descriptive rung of Methven's intelligence ladder."

Peake, Studies 55.3 (Sep. 2011), finds that "[b]y sharing both the good and bad, Methven provides his readers with a product that feele honest and unpretentious.... [H]e does not come across as someone with an axe to grind."


Metz, Steven. "A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support after the Cold War." Parameters 25 (Autumn 1995): 31-41.


Metz, Steven. The Literature of Low-Intensity Conflict: A Selected Bibliography and Suggestions for Future Research. Langley AFB, VA: Army-Navy-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1988. [Petersen]


Metz, Steven. "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency." Parameters 37. no. 4 (Winter 2007-2008): 20-32.

Following the events of 9/11, "insurgency was again viewed as a strategic threat.... The global campaign against violent Islamic extremists forced the United States military to undertake counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.... The military services scrambled to develop new concepts and doctrine.[footnote omitted] Counterinsurgency ... became a centerpiece for Army and Marine Corps training.... There is a problem, however: As the American military relearned counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine, it may not have gotten them right."


Metz, Steven, and Raymond A. Millen. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response." Special Warfare 17 (Feb. 2005): 6-21.


Metzger, Laurent. "Joseph Ducroux, a French Agent of the Comintern in Singapore." Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 69, no. 1 (1996); 1-20.


Metzl, Lothar. "Reflections on the Soviet Secret Police and Intelligence Services." Orbis 18, no. 3 (Fall 1974).


Meulstee, Louis. Wireless for the Warrior: A Technical History of Radio Communication Equipment in the British Army. 4 vols. Ferndown/Dorset, UK: Wimborne, 1995-2004.

Vol. 1: Wireless Sets No. 1 to 88. 1995.

Vol 2: Standard Sets for World War II. 1998.

Meulstee's web site ( says that volumes 1 and 2 "cover transmitters and transceivers used [in] the period 1932-1948."

Vol. 3: Reception Sets. 2001.

Meulstee states that this volume describes Army receivers, "spanning the era 1932 to the late 1960s." It covers not only "those receivers specifically designed or adapted for the British Army, but also sets adopted from Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.... [S]pecial receivers, direction finding receivers, Canadian and Australian Army receivers, commercial receivers adopted by the Army and Army Welfare broadcast sets" are also covered.

Vol. 4: and Rudolf F. Staritz. Wireless for the Warrior: A Technical History of Radio Communication Equipment in Clandestine and Special Forces Operations -- Clandestine Radio. 2004.

Meulstee notes that this volume includes "Clandestine, Agents or 'Spy' radio equipment, sets which were used by Special Forces, Partisans, Resistance, 'Stay Behind' organisations, Australian Coast Watchers and Diplomatic Service, in addition to selected associated power sources, RDF and intercept receivers, bugs and radio- and radar beacons. The information has been compiled through the collaboration of a vast number of collectors and enthusiasts around the world." The time period is from about 1938 up to the early 1990s. "[S]atellite equipment and radios which might be still in current use" are not included.

Lippmann, JIH 5.2 (Winter 2005), sees volume 4 as "an important contribution in eliminating some of the ... gaps in the analysis of military and secret service history" in the 20th century.... Not only is the content weighty,... but it is easy to read and as a reference work, which it primarily is, it is easy to use."


Meydani, Assaf. "The Interrogation Policy of the Israeli General Security Service: Between Law and Politics." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 26-39.

A 1999 ruling of the Israeli High Court of Justice "forbids the use of physical pressure in interrogations. Even so, it does not completely rule out the possibility that interrogators might use such methods, and then seek protection from the law under a claim of 'need,' which would absolve them of criminal responsibility if the offenses were committed in order to save lives."



Meyerhoff, Hans. "Through the Liberal Looking Glass -- Darkly." Partisan Review 22 (1955): 238-245.

For a flavor of the passions of the times, this article should be read in conjunction with Diana Trilling's defense of J. Robert Oppenheimer in "The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony," Partisan Review 21 (1954): 604-635. See also Diana Trilling, "A Rejoinder to H. Meyerhoff," Partisan Review 22 (1955): 248-251.


Miami Herald. "Faget Pleads Not Guilty to Spying." 7 Mar. 2000. []

On 6 March 2000, Mariano Faget entered a formal plea of not guilty in U.S. District Court to charges of "communicating national defense information, conversion of government property for personal use and [making] three false statements."


Miannay, Patrice. Dictionnaire des agents doubles dans la Resistance. Paris: Cherche Midi, 2005.


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