McNab, Andy. Bravo Two Zero: The Harrowing True Story of a Special Forces Patrol Behind the Lines in Iraq. New York: Island Books, 1994. New York: Bantam, 1994. [pb]
From publisher: "In January 1991 a squad of eight [British SAS] men went behind the Iraqi lines on a top secret mission. It was called Bravo Two Zero. On command was Sergeant Andy McNab.... McNab and his men found themselves surrounded by Saddam's army.... Eight set out. Five came back." The book is "[f]illed with no-holds-barred detail about McNab's capture and excruciating torture."
[UK/Postwar/SAS/Iraq]
McNab, Andy. Immediate Action. New York: Dell, 1996. London: Corgi, 1996.
From publisher: The author, who served in SAS 1984-1993, "chronicl[es] nine years of covert operations on five continents."
[UK/Postwar/SAS]
McNamara,
Francis. U.S. Counterintelligence Today. Washington, DC: Nathan Hale Institute, 1985.
[CI/To90s]
McNamara, Francis J. "Let's Keep Our Old-Fashioned 'National Security.'" National Security Law Report 15, no. 3 (Mar. 1993): 1, 3-4.
"Counterpoint" to Gregory D. Foster, NSLR 15.1:1-2. "[Foster's] arguments betray misconceptions about the beliefs of our forbears, constitutional objectives, and national security."
[Reform/90s][c]
McNamara, Robert. "'Let's Make It Clear that We'll Get Him Sooner or Later': British Covert Action against Nasser's Egypt in the Aftermath of Suez." In Intelligence, Statecraft and International Power: Historical Studies XXV, eds. Eunan OHalpin, Robert Armstrong, and Jane Ohlmeyer, 222-234. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006.
[UK/Postwar/Suez]
McNamara,
Robert S., with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books/Random House, 1995.
Choice, Sep. 1995, notes that McNamara "kept his silence for almost 30 years. Now that he has spoken -- in this extraordinary book -- he has reinflamed all the old passions and ignited a media extravaganza. The issue and controversy of Robert McNamara's mea culpa aside, this is one of the most important books on Vietnam in years.... McNamara's perspective is one of the most important on the complex and enigmatic Lyndon Johnson.... This is the most forthright memoir about culpability, error, and moral failure that this reviewer knows."
Polgar, CIRA Newsletter, Summer 1995, and Surveillant 4.2, expresses strong distaste for McNamara's In Retrospect, terming the work "misleading and disingenuous." According to Polgar, McNamara blames Vietnam "on the uncritical acceptance of the prevailing foreign policy concepts and the lack of expertise on East Asia in the State Department. This is nonsense." Polgar concludes that "McNamara's book is an example of his pervasive bad judgment, arrogance and vanity."
For Ford, Studies 39.5, McNamara's account is "ambiguous, debatable, and, above all, selective.... In Retrospect is nonetheless worth absorbing for the contributions it makes concerning the Vietnam policymaking process and the role therein that US intelligence did and did not play.... McNamara does not give CIA judgments specific credit for helping him change his basic attitude toward the war, but the inference is clear that he ... came increasingly to respect CIA's reporting candor and good track record."
[Vietnam/Gen]
McNamee,
Luke. "Naval Intelligence." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
50 (Sep. 1924): 1444.
[MI/Navy/Interwar]
McNaughton, James C. Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006.
Mercado, Studies 52.4 (Dec. 2008), finds that the "numerous footnotes and long bibliography" in this "wide-ranging" book "attest to the years of research" the author devoted to his work. Although "the absence of Japanese sources is regrettable," McNaughton has produced "an excellent history."
[WWII/FEPac/Nisei]
McNeal, Antoine C. [1LT/USAF] "Information Assurance: Structure from the Fog, A Dynamic Information Defense Solution in a Dynamic World." Chronicles Online Journal (6 Dec. 2004). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/archives.html -- no longer available, 7/25/11]
[GenPostwar/InfoWar]
McNeil, Donald G.,
Jr. "Libyan Convicted by Scottish Court in '88
Pan Am Bombing." New York Times, 1 Feb. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 31 January 2001, a Scottish court sitting at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands, "found a Libyan intelligence official [Abdelbaset Ali Mohmedal-Megrahi] guilty of murder in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988,... but did not convict the second defendant [Al Amin Khalifah Fhimah] and released him.... Megrahi ... was told [by the court] that a life sentence was mandatory under Scottish law, and that the court, 'in view of the horrendous nature of the crime,' wished him to serve 20 years before any parole consideration."
[Terrorism/01/Gen]
McNeil, Donald G.,
Jr. "Loss of Face at Lockerbie." New
York Times, 1 Oct. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]
The credibility of the U.S. intelligence community "suffered at the Lockerbie trial this week." Both the CIA and the FBI "appeared badly singed by the results of the first-ever release of C.I.A. cables in a foreign court, by a series of evasive answers from an F.B.I. investigator and by the poor showing by the witness, Abdul Majid Giaka, who spent three years on the C.I.A. payroll.... The cables revealed that even his C.I.A. handlers had doubts about Mr. Abdul Majid."
[CIA/00/Gen; Terrorism/00]
McNeil,
Frank. "Post Cold War Intelligence: Meeting the Need for Reform."
Foreign Service Journal (Feb. 1992): 20-23.
[Reform/90s]
McNeil, Phyllis Provost. "The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community -- An Historical Overview." In Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World, eds. Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, 5-20. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury, 2004.
Lehneman, IJI&C 20.1 (Spring 2007), calls this "an excellent synopsis since 1947" of the "continuous scrutiny and various forms of adjustment to [the] institutions and processes" of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
[Reform/00s/Gen]
McNeish, James. The Sixth Man: The Extraordinary Life of Paddy Costello. Auckland, NZ: Random House, New Zealand, 2007.
According to Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), the author "strives mightily to dismiss ... as fanciful speculation." the idea that Cambridge-grad Paddy Costello was a Soviet agent. However, the arguments he makes "are mere speculation and ignore important facts reported by others."
[OtherCountries/NewZealand]
McNicholas, Michael. Maritime Security. London and New York: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008.
Poteat, Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), says that "[f]or the national security practitioner, here is a textbook on use of cargo containers and vessels: by criminals, drug traffickers and terrorists; threat mitigation strategies; and information security and assurance."
[GenPostwar/NatSec/00s]
Return to M Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of
Contents