Mahon, Tom. "The Secret IRA-Soviet Agreement, 1925." History Ireland 17, no. 3 (2009).
"In the summer of 1925,... [the IRA] sent a delegation to Moscow to solicit finance and weaponry from the Soviet Union . The group was led by the well-known Cork gunman P.A. Murray, who met privately with Joseph Stalin . Both parties made a secret agreement: the IRA would spy for the Soviets in Britain and America, as well as support their strategic goals, and in return receive a monthly payment of £500 . For the next few years [Moss] Twomey, in collaboration with his close associate [Andy] Cooney, oversaw the IRA's relationship with the Soviet Union . Around , however, the Soviets backed away."
Mahon, Thomas, and James J. Gillogly. Decoding the IRA. Dublin: Mercier Press, 2009.
From publisher: "Historian Tom Mahon and code breaker James J. Gillogly have spent the past few years breaking the IRA's communications code." In the years following the civil war, the "code was used for the organisation's most secret messages, including those sent back and forth to undercover agents in Britain and America. The results ... expose IRA secrets that have been concealed for over 75 years." Kahn, Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), notes that this "important work" provides a cryptanalysis of 312 IRA communications from 1925 to 1928.
Budiansky, Cryptologia 33.3 (Jul. 2009), calls this work "a remarkable feat of historical detective work, painstaking and exacting." It provides "a valuable and at times fascinating look at the inner workings of a secret terrorist organization on the skids." However, the book would have been better if "Gillogly's detailed explanation of tranposition ciphers and his cryptanalytic methods" had been placed "in an appendix rather than making it the book's (lengthy) first chapter." In addition, "[t]he index is so poor as to be almost useless."
Maier, Timothy, and Sean Paige. "Does America Need the CIA?" Insight on the News, 17 Aug. 1998, 17-20.
Mains, A. A. [Lt.-Col.] Field Security: Very Ordinary Intelligence. Chippenham, UK: Picton Publishing, 1992.
According to Surveillant 3.1, this book is the story "of the development of Field Security by the author who was in India and Iraq during WWII. The underlying theme is the field burden placed on junior officers and the training they receive. Mains shows how intelligence and security operate in the confusion of war." Watt, I&NS 9.2, comments that the author's "experience ... was essentially at the level of senior management, rather than that of field experience." His job entailed "a good deal of civilian security work." The book is "rather heavy going." Although it "fills in the political background competently," the "narrative ... never really comes alive."
Mains, A. A. "Intelligence in India, 1930-47." Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 79, no. 317 (2001): 63-82.
Maiolo, Joseph A. "Deception and Intelligence Failure: Anglo-German Preparations for U-boat Warfare in the 1930s." Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 4 (Dec. 1999): 55-76.
From abstract: "This essay ... argues that the Royal Navy (RN) employed the general perception of ASDIC (sonar) as a 'antidote' to the submarine to mislead potential foes about the state of its anti-submarine defences.... [T]he German Navy failed to discover the realities behind ASDIC's image, and this intelligence failure helped to shape U-boat policy."
Maiolo, Joseph A. "'I believe the Hun is cheating': British Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-39." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 32-58.
This article reconstructs "Admiralty technical intelligence analysis about German capital ships and U-boats from 1936 to 1939.... Evidence ... demonstrates that technical assessors performed better than has been previously acknowledged."
Maiolo, Joseph A. The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1998.
Gardner, I&NS 16.3, notes that this work includes "a critical investigation into the role that intelligence played in shaping the British Admiralty's perceptions and policies.... Collection and analysis are both written about at length as is the application of the derived product to policy.... [T]his is a densely written work, rewarding the careful reader but unlikely to be fully appreciated by anyone who has a superficial knowledge or understanding of the period."
Maior, George Cristian. "Managing Change: The Romanian Intelligence Service in the 21st Century." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 217-239.
The author was appointed Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) in 2006. Here, he argues that the easiest way to picture the story of the changes in Romanian intelligence "is to align the images of the Securitate in 1989 and the SRI in 2011 and compare a most oppressive mechanism, a security secret service in a totalitarian state, with a threat-based risk management organizattion, an accountable intelligence agency in a democratic regime."
Majeranowski, Pete [LT/USN]. "Knowledge Web Plays Big in Transformation." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 7 (Jul. 2003): 43-48.
"Among members of the Carl Vinson (CVN 70) Battle Group during Operation Enduring Freedom, information had to be transmitted with near-real-time speed. 'The Web is the brief' -- the mantra of Battle Group Commander Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor... -- helped drive the knowledge-web culture through the ranks of the battle group and battle force, connecting people with information as never before." See also Eileen F. MacKrell [CAPT/USN], "Network-Centric Intelligence Works," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 7 (Jul. 2003): 44-48.
Major, David G. "Operation 'Famish': The Integration of Counterintelligence into the National Strategic Decisionmaking Process." Defense Intelligence Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 29-55.
Operation "Famish" was the FBI codename for a series of national security policy decisions implemented March-November 1986. Eighty KGB and GRU officers were ordered to leave the United States. Major's article examines "the interagency structure and process" through which the Operation "Famish" decisions were made.
Major, James S. Communicating with Intelligence: Writing and Briefing in the Intelligence and National Security Communities. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2008.
Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), notes that the author "taught a writing and briefing course at the National Defense Intelligence College for many years, and his book lays out the practices he developed to help his students acquire the skill that is so essential to success in the intelligence profession." This work "is a welcome addition to intelligence literature and will be valuable to students and the teachers who must read their papers."
For Bean, IJI&C 22.2 (Summer 2009), the author's "deep understanding of the interconnections between communication and intelligence" results in "a book useful to both practitioners and scholars.... [S]tudents and practitioners of intelligence will benefit from the extensive individual and group exercises included at the end of many of the book's chapters." If McClanahan, AIJ 29.1 (2011), "could assign people in search of a national security writing guide one book to read, it would be this one."
Major, John [Prime Minister], and Tom King [CH MP, Chairman, Intelligence and Security Committee]. Intelligence and Security Committee: Annual Report 1995, Intelligence Services Act of 1994, Chapter 13. London: HMSO, 1996.
Surveillant 4.2: These annual reports tend to "say little since they operate within ... the Official Secrets Act of 1989." This report, however, does criticize the United States "for being lax in sharing information from ongoing debriefings of Soviet spy Aldrich Ames."
Major, Patrick, and Christopher Moran, eds. Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2010.
From publisher: "These essays draw together Britain's leading intelligence historians to present a fresh and original study of British secrecy since 1945. A combination of synoptic works and empirical case studies, drawing on recently declassified archival materials, the essays touch upon several historiographical concerns: the advantages and disadvantages of greater openness; the accuracy of media reporting on secret services; the representation of intelligence in popular culture; and, the use and misuse of intelligence in the so-called 'War on Terror.' A focal point of this volume is the role of intelligence in imperial contexts, especially during the period of decolonization."
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