Mah - Mahn

Mahadevan, Prem. "The Failure of Indian Intelligence in the Sino-Indian Conflict." Journal of Intelligence History 8, no. 1 (Summer 2008). []


Mahadevan, Prem. The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in South Asia. New York: Tauris, 2012.

Peake, Studies 56.3 (Sep. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.3 (Winter-Spring 2013), finds that this book provides "a very detailed conceptual analysis, supported by case studies, and backed by secondary sources. It is well worth serious attention by those concerned with the analyst-decisionmaker relationship."


Maher, William. "Parliament Passes ASIO Bill." Australian Consolidated Press, 26 Nov. 1999. []

On 25 November 1999, the Australian Parliament passed the ASIO Amendment Bill 1999, which allows ASIO "to tap into and alter data on private computer systems.... This is the first time in 13 years a major change has been made to the ASIO Act 1979."


Maheu, Robert, and Richard Hack. Next to Hughes. New York: HarperCollins, 1993.

Robert A. Maheu died at the age of 90 on 4 August 2008. See Matt Schudel, "Robert Maheu, 90; Tycoon's Aide, CIA Spy," Washington Post, 6 Aug. 2008, B5.

Surveillant 2.4 notes that this book includes a "somewhat breathless insider's account of Maheu's role in a small part of Operation Mongoose -- the code name given to the second Bay of Pigs operation.... [He] adds little that is new." According to NameBase, "Maheu tells about his work for the CIA (he was the CIA-Mafia liaison for the assassination attempts on Castro).... But in the end Maheu sees himself as just another nice guy who got taken for a ride, and many of his readers will feel that there's still plenty he'd prefer not to share with commoners like us."

[CIA/60s/Gen; CIA/70s/Glomar]

Mahl, Thomas E. Desperate Deceptions: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-44. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1998.

Cohen, FA 77.4 (Jul.-Aug. 1998), calls Desperate Deceptions a "fascinating account of some of the activities of the British [to get the United States into World War II], running the gamut from cleverly skewed spurious polls to the creation of front organizations funded by British intelligence." Seamon, Proceedings 124.12 (Dec. 1998), says that "[t]his record of ... long years of clandestine service [by British covert operatives] is a fascinating addition to the literature on the war."

For Troy, IJI&C 11.4, Mahl "writes clearly and forcefully, but often with much glibness and exaggeration." To the reviewer, it is noteworthy that the text includes only three references to British Prime Minister Churchill. And he finds "untrue ... the assertion made six times ... that Stephenson's deputy, Col. Charles H. ('Dick') Ellis, 'ran' Donovan's organization."

Even more negative about this work is Watt, I&NS 14.2, who argues that Mahl "has used the results of his research to write a polemic that is so over the top as to raise serious doubts ... about the ... peer review which is supposed to precede the decision of a reputable publisher to accept his work for publication." Charles, I&NS 15.2, concludes that "[t]oo few of the arguments presented in this book are convincing; too many are based on innuendo and speculation."


Mahl, Tom E. The Top Ten Book of Malicious Moles, Blown Covers, and Intelligence Oddities. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2003.

Jonkers, AFIO WIN 21 (30 May 2003), calls this "[a] book to sample. It provides a range of short stories of the good, the bad and the ugly of the world of espionage.... For easy light reading and browsing."


Mahle, Melissa Boyle. Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA From Iran-Contra to 9/11. New York: Thunder's Mouth, Nation Books, 2005.

To Hedley, Studies 49.3 (2005), the author presents "a balanced mix of personal story and thoughtful, well-researched perspective on the Agency and its leadership." Mahle renders "an educational service with a book that is at once autobiography, primer, and commentary on the Agency and its tribulations."

Coll, Washington Post, 14 Jan. 2005, notes that the author "served five tours in the Arab world, running operations and recruiting agents. But now, after departing unhappily from the CIA in 2002..., Mahle is the latest in a parade of disillusioned spies to write a memoir.... [She] sees her former agency as too often mired in process, averse to risk and poorly managed." Nevertheless, her book "is measured in tone and often generous to former colleagues and CIA leaders."

For Shane, NYT, 15 Mar. 2005, Mahle's book "blend[s] personal experiences with policy critiques." The author is "an Arabic speaker who worked mostly in the Middle East during her 14-year career" with the CIA. DKR, AFIO WIN 08-05 (21 Feb. 2005), says that the author provides "[a]n informative work, clearly written, critical but with unusual fairness."


Mahnken, Thomas G. "Gazing at the Sun: The Office of Naval Intelligence and Japanese Naval Innovation, 1918-1941." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 424-441.

"Scholars have as a group been critical of the performance of US intelligence in the years prior to World War II.... The charge historians most frequently level is that racial stereotypes ... blinded the US Navy to the growth of Japanese power.... If racial bias was pervasive..., then one would expect to find a consistent pattern of underestimation of Japanese capabilities.... [N]o such pattern is apparent. Rather the record is one of relatively accurate assessment during the 1920s and early 1930s, followed by ... generally less detailed reporting beginning in the mid-1930s.... [S]uch a pattern was the result not of ... distorted racial stereotypes, but of the failure of both analytical constructs and preconceived beliefs about war to accommodate the development of new weapons and concepts by Japan."

[Interwar/U.S.; MI/Navy/Interwar][c]

Mahnken, Thomas G. Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.

According to Bacevich, FA 82.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2003), the author reassesses the performance of the U.S. Army's MID and the Navy's ONI during the interwar period. Mahnken "finds that those two largely neglected institutions performed with considerable effectiveness" in that time. He "also explores why authorities in Washington -- skeptical of evidence that departed from their own conception of warfare -- failed in too many instances" to give intelligence about the innovations that would prove decisive when war came "the credence that it deserved."

Campbell, NIPQ 18.2/3, sees this as a "work of first-rate scholarship.... Mahnken concludes that American military intelligence during the Interwar period succeeded to obtain information on established ways of war -- such as tank warfare, airplanes, and amphibious warfare -- but failed to grasp the emerging ways of war, such as carrier strikes, radar and rockets."

For Mercado, IJI&C 16.3, the author's "historical review and subsequent conclusions are based on solid archival research and on extensive reading of secondary sources.... Uncovering Ways of War thoughtfully revises the conventional view of interwar military intelligence." Avant, Journal of Cold War Studies 6 (2004), says that the author "provides excellent case studies, telling us what the [U.S. military and naval] attachés actually did and how they contributed to U.S. preparations, and will be a great resource for future scholars."

Peake, Studies 46.4, finds that Mahnken "examines the primary sources and evaluates nine cases of 'innovation,' wherein Army and Navy intelligence elements tried to do, and in several instances accomplished, just what they were supposed to do.... This is a very valuable study. Conventional wisdom has been refuted and some practical guidance for the future provided." To Hanyok, I&NS 18.3, this work "is an important step in evaluating the effectiveness of intelligence." Mahnken "considers the entire context of how the intelligence was gathered," and "[h]is arguments and discussions are clear and comprehensive."

[Interwar/U.S.; MI/Army/Interwar; MI/Navy/Interwar]

Mahnken, Thomas G.  "War in the Information Age."  Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1995-1996, 39-43.


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