MacEachin, Douglas J.
MacFarlane, Robert C., and Zofia Smardz. Special Trust. New York: Cadell & Davis,
1994.
Proceedings 121.4 (Apr. 1995): "MacFarlane recounts his decades of service and in doing so provides a revealing look at the inner workings of the foreign policy crafted by the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan Administrations. Not surprisingly, a large part of this book is devoted to his involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal -- which he deals with both forcefully and with candor."
[GenPostwar/80s/Iran-Contra]
Macfie, Alexander Lyon. "British Intelligence and the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919-21." Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 1 (1999): 165-177.
[UK/Interwar/20s]
Macfie, Alexander Lyon.
1. "British Intelligence and the Turkish National Movement, 1919-22." Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 1 (Jan. 2001): 1-16.
2. "British Views of the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia, 1919-22." Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 4 (2002): 27-46.
[OtherCountries/Turkey; UK/Interwar/20s]
[MacGaffin, John]. "Speech by John MacGaffin, CIRA Luncheon, 1 May 2001." CIRA Newsletter 26, nos. 2 & 3 (Summer-Fall 2001): 3-9.
The ADDO talks about the genesis of CI-21.
[CI/01]
Machon, Annie. Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers: MI5, MI6 and the Shayler Affair. Brighton, UK: Book Guild, 2005.
Clark comment: Machon worked for MI5 in the 1990s and was David Shayler's girlfriend. From publisher: The author "writes about her experiences at the heart of the secret state and what happens when you stand up to it. Her revelations about illegal intelligence operations, cover-ups to ministers, and particularly the MI6 funding of Al Qaeda terrorists will shock all of us."
[UK/PostCW/90s/Shayler/From99]
Macintosh, Charles. From Cloak to Dagger: A SOE Agent in Italy, 1943-45. London: Kimber, 1982.
From Nigel Perrin, http://nigelperrin.com/soe-biographies.htm#.UWA183DR3Hg: "Macintosh was operations officer with No.1 Special Force in Italy and supported the partisans in the battle for Florence in August 1944. The remainder of the book follows the progress of later tactical missions and concentrates on operational detail."
[UK/WWII/Services/SOE; WWII/Eur/Italy]
MacIntyre, Ben, Times (London).
Mack, Jefferson. Running a Ring of Spies: Spycraft and Black Operations in the Real World of Espionage. Boulder, CO: Paladin, 1996. [pb]
From publisher: "Running a ring of spies is no mission impossible with this tell-all primer. Find out the secrets of the world's best spies and peep into the real world of ... spies." The author worked "in Latin America and Southeast Asia for 20 years with one of the many different intelligence agencies of the United States."
[Overviews/Gen/90s]
Mackay, Donald. The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood. London-Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1997.
[UK/Postwar/Malaya]
Mackey, Chris [?pseud.], and Greg Miller. The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War against Al Qaeda. New York: Little, Brown, 2004.
According to Marisa, DIJ 14.1 (2005), Mackey "documents his firsthand experiences as a U.S. Army tactical interrogator," including as "senior Army interrogator in Afghansistan ... at Kandahar and Bagram" until the fall of 2002.... [F]or those ... interested in learning more about operational military HUMINT, particularly about military interrogation, debriefing, and counterintelligence operations[,] ... this book will be of high interest."
[MI/Army/00s; MI/Ops/Afghanistan]
Mackey, Robert R. The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005.
Fisher, Civil War Book Review [http://www.cwbr.com], finds that this work "offers a systematic evaluation of the role that irregular operations played in Confederate strategy in the Upper South and the effectiveness of Union responses to these operations." The author "argues that the Confederate government made extensive use of unconventional operations, but that Union forces defeated or neutralized every attempt." On the downside, Mackey "seems determined to cast his analysis within a framework of military doctrine, even though that concept would have had limited meaning to most Civil War officers.... More serious is [his] insistence on viewing the unconventional war almost entirely from a centralized, military perspective.... [A]ny analysis of irregular warfare that leaves out its political, social, and even cultural elements will inevitably prove inadequate and perhaps even misleading."
[CivWar/R&G]
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