Low, Andrew S. "No Glamour-No Daggers." Army Information Digest 2 (May 1947): 29-32.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/Bibliographies: "Profile of attaché's purpose and duties."
Lowe, Joseph D. [Col., Chinese Army, Ret.] Dictionary of Military Terms and Military Intelligence Phrases: Chinese-English and English-Chinese. [US]: Lowe Publications, 1992.
Surveillant 2.4: "Designed for the specialist."
Lowe, Thaddeus S.C.
Lowe was one of the pioneers in using balloons for operational reconnaissance, and as a civilian, headed the balloon corps of the Army of the Potomac from August 1861 to May 1863.
1. "Balloon Operations during the Civil War." In The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series 3, vol. 3. Washington, DC: GPO, 1899.
2. "Observation Balloons in the Battle of Fair Oaks." American Review of Reviews 63, no. 2 (1911): 186-190. [Petersen]
3. Eds., Michael Jaeger and Carol Lauritzen. Memoirs of Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, Chief of the Aeronautic Corps of the Army of the United States During the Civil War: My Balloons in Peace and War. London and New York: Edwin Mellen, 2004.
Miller, Civil War Times, http://www.historynet.com/reviews, notes that these are Lowe's unpublished memoirs completed in 1911. "Written long after the war, Lowe's work contains some minor errors and self-promotion. In addition, in the later chapters -- dealing with the period after his resignation [after the Battle of Chancellorsville] -- Lowe relies heavily on previously published reports and articles rather than his own experiences."
Lowenhaupt, Henry S.
1. "Chasing Bitterfeld Calcium." Studies in Intelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 1973): 21-30.
2. "The Decryption of a Picture." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 41-53.
"Puzzling out the power supply to Urals atom plants."
3. "On the Soviet Nuclear Scent." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 4 (Fall 1967): 13-29. Studies in Intelligence: 45th Anniversary Special Edition, Fall 2000, 53-69.
"Traces of the borrowed German scientists combine with other scraps of information to throw light on the USSR's early atomic program."
4. "Ravelling Russia's Reactors." Studies in Intelligence 16, no. 3 (Fall 1972): 65-79.
Westerfield: "Multidisciplinary intelligence analysis in the late 1950s of how a major nuclear production facility in central Siberia worked."
5. "Somewhere in Siberia." Studies in Intelligence 15, no. 1 (Winter 1971): 35-51.
This article describes a late-1950s effort to understand the Soviet atomic weapons program.
Lowenhaupt, Henry S. "Mission to Birch Woods, via Seven Tents and New Siberia." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 4 (Fall 1968): 1-12.
Westerfield: "How CIA set targets for the first U-2 flights over Soviet nuclear production and testing facilities in 1957."
Lowenthal, John. "Venona and Alger Hiss." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 98-130.
The author, Alger Hiss' lawyer, argues that the Venona team "employed false premises and flawed comparative logic to reach the desired conclusion that Alger Hiss was the spy Ales, a conclusion psychologically motivated and politically correct but factually wrong.... [This is] a warning to view other Venona product with caution and skepticism."
Eduard Mark, "Who Was 'Venona's' 'Ales'? Cryptanalysis and the Hiss Case," Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 45-72, effectively refutes Lowenthal's reading of Venona Cable No. 1822 and suggests that Cable No. 195 from Moscow to New York adds further support to the case against Hiss.
David Lowenthal and Roger Sandilands, "Eduard Mark on Venona's 'Ales': A Note." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 509-512, provide a "summary" of a draft response written by John Lowenthal prior to his death. That response concluded "that Mark had refuted neither the facts nor the reasoning presented in his [Lowenthal's] article."
Lowenthal, Mark M. - A-I
Lowenthal, Mark M. - J-Z
Lowenthal, Max. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. New York: Sloane, 1950. London: Turnstile, 1950.
Hannant, I&NS 6.4/732/fn. 8, refers to Lowenthal's as a "pioneering study of the FBI,... [which] contains more than any other about the Bureau's security screening efforts."
Lowi, Miriam R., and Brian R. Shaw, eds. Environment and Security: Discourses and Practices. New York: Palgrave, 2000.
Barnett, Environmental Change & Security Project Report, Summer 2001, comments that the editors "include more exploration [than other works] of the complex relationship between environmental change and security by drawing on more disciplines and perspectives.... This is an excellent and useful book that deserves to be on the shelves of anyone seriously interested in contemporary developments in environment and security research."
Lowman, David D. MAGIC: The Untold Story of U.S. Intelligence and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents from the West Coast During WWII. Provo, UT: Athena, 2000.
According to Publisher's Weekly, 1 Jan. 2001, declassified "intelligence records, including sources from MAGIC," describe "systematic recruitment of Japanese residents, citizens and noncitizens into networks designed to provide information to Japan both before and after the outbreak of war." The author "makes a solid case that the intelligence community's faith in its credibility contributed significantly to the government's decision" on internment. Nevertheless, "too often Lowman's documents are left to speak for themselves, without a supporting analytical structure."
Kruh, Cryptologia 28.3, notes that the author provides copies of the MAGIC intercepts revealing "the existence of a widespread domestic Japanese threat" and "includes reproductions of declassified reports from three U.S. intelligence organizations that were charged with discovering the true scope of the problem."
After noting the author's extensive use of primary sources, Budiansky, Proceedings 127.4 (Apr. 2001), concludes that "Lowman makes a persuasive case that it was not mere hysteria for the U.S. government to fear that at least some Japanese Americans posed a security risk.... Lowman is far less persuasive, however, in arguing that Magic intelligence provided the smoking gun to U.S. officials who ordered the evacuation.... [And the author] seems simply obtuse at times to the suffering that the evacuees, the overwhelming majority of them loyal Americans, endured."
Lownie, Andrew. "Tyler Kent: The Spy in the Code Room." Back Channels 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 16-17.
U.S. code clerk arrested in London in 1940 for spying; question remains, "Who for?"
Lowrey, Dennis A. [LTCOL/USA] "Center Without Walls: Training in the Information Age." Military Intelligence 21, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1995): 45-48.
Loxton, Bruce, with Chris Coulthard-Clark. The Shame of Savo: Anatomy of a Naval Disaster. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.
Bell, I&NS 11.3, notes that much of this book "deals with the question of how the Allies, who generally outgunned the Japanese in intelligence between 1942 and 1945, could have been caught so completely off guard by this enemy attack." The surprise attack ranks as "one of the most dramatic failures in operational intelligence to befall Allied naval forces during the war." The author finds failures "in Allied communications, planning and training," showing that the explanation behind the disaster is more complex than commentators have generally assumed.
Return to L Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents