Lindsay, Franklin. Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993. 1996. [pb]
According to Fontaine, FILS 12.5, Lindsey "served in wartime Slovenia" and here gives us an "excellent war memoir." His "account is fresh, and often lively" with a "gritty feel." This is an "excellent source book on OSS training and procedures." The author "saw the corruption in the partisan movement even before it achieved power."
Lewis, IJI&C 7.2, comments that "[e]vocative prose and attention to detail are the hallmarks" of Lindsay's memoir. He "provides an important chronicle of the intelligence techniques employed by the Allies." His "discussion of ciphers, danger signals, and the one-time pad are of particular interest.... Lindsay's conclusions and the lessons to be derived from his experience are timeless." This is an "important counterbalance to the British viewpoint" in Deakin's The Embattled Mountain and Maclean's Eastern Approaches. Surveillant 3.4/5 recommends this book as "[t]imely and beautifully told."
For Kruh, Cryptologia 18.2, Beacons in the Night "is a thrilling account of sabotage operations behind enemy lines." Kruh's comment that the author's "experiences and observations on the ethnic and religious hatreds in the region are an introduction to the tragedy there today" was written in 1994.
Lindsay, Franklin A. "Unconventional Warfare." Foreign Affairs 40, no. 2 (Spring 1962): 264-274.
Lindsay, Kennedy. Ambush at Tully-West: The British Intelligence Service in Action. Dundalk: Dunrod Press, 1980.
Lindsey, Robert. The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979. New York: Pocket Books, 1979. [pb] London: Jonathan Cape, 1980.
Clark comment: Lindsey tells the story of how Christopher John Boyce and Andrew Daulton Lee sold out TRW, the CIA, and their country. Constantinides finds this book surprisingly good, given the brief length of time the author had to work on it. Nonetheless, "there are errors and some aspects that cause criticism.... There is a tendency toward broad, flat statements.... The plethora of direct quotes and descriptive detail lacks any source notes whatsoever." Lindsey tells the story of Boyce's escape and recapture in The Flight of the Falcon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).
Linebarger, Paul M.A. Psychological Warfare. Washington, DC: Infantry Press, 1948.
Watt, I&NS 15.4, 161/fn11, comments that this "is the closest we have in American literature to a textbook for professional psychological warriors."
Lineberry, Cate. The Secret Rescue: An Untold Story of American Nurses and Medics Behind Nazi Lines. Boston: Little, Brown, 2013.
To Peake, Studies 58.1 (Mar. 2014), this "is a well-told story of wartime cooperation and heroism," as Albanian partisans, SOE, and OSS worked to get the medics and nurses, whose plane had crashed in Albania, back to safety.
Linklater, Andro. Compton Mackenzie, A Life. London: Chatto & Windrus, 1987.
Ferris, I&NS 4.2, finds that although he "improves our understanding of the psychology" of Mackenzie, the author's "discussion of the actions of the intelligence officer is somewhat disappointing.... Linklater adds nothing of substance to Mackenzie's account" in Gallipoli Memories, First Athenian Memories, Greek Memories, and Aegean Memories.
Linn, Brian M. Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
Dunnavent, History 26.1, praises Guardians of Empire as "the definitive work on the U.S. Army in the Pacific from the Philippine wars to World War II."
Linn, Brian M.
1. "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 90-114.
"It is not too harsh to conclude that for much of the Philippine War, American intelligence was as diffuse, unconnected and disorganized as the resistance the soldiers encountered in the field.... Only at the end of the war, and then only in an area close to the DMI's [Division of Military Information; created by MacArthur in December 1900] headquarters, was the army's official intelligence agency able to play a major role in ending Filipino resistance." What occurred instead was that the officers in the field developed and implemented their own localized intelligence methods.
2. The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
O'Toole, I&NS 6.1, calls Linn's work "the most authoritative study to date of this all-but-forgotten chapter of American military history.... Linn has selected four districts on ... Luzon for his study, and he concentrates on both the military and non-military aspects of the US Army's pacification program within each of them.... [A]s intelligence was an integral part of counter-insurgency operations, ... [the author] presents a far more detailed picture than has been published before."
[Historical; MI/Army; MI/SpecOps]
Linnen, Jim [COL/USA (Ret.)]. "Department of Defense Counterintelligence (CI): A DoD CI Staff Perspective." American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 1-5.
"Implementing the conclusions of the CI 21 interagency review is the single, most important effort of the DoD and National CI Community in the coming year.... Within DoD CI our single most important initiative is the establishment" of a Joint CI Center (JCIC).
Lintner, Bertil. "The CIA's First Secret War: Americans Helped Stage Raids into China from Burma." Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 Sep. 1993, 56-58.
Linzer, Dafna. "Goss, 8 Ex-Chiefs of CIA Mark Old Post's Passing: Responsibilities Now Held by Negroponte." Washington Post, 17 Aug. 2005, A11. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
At CIA headquarters in Langley, VA, on 16 August 2005, "CIA Director Porter J. Goss threw a wake.... With eight former intelligence chiefs at his side, including former president George H.W. Bush, Goss honored the influential and powerful position they have all held: director of central intelligence, a job that no longer exists."
[CIA/DCIs/Gen & Goss]
Linzer, Dafna. "Teaching Recent History From Opposite Perspectives: At Georgetown, It's Feith vs. Tenet and Policy vs. Intelligence." Washington Post, 7 May 2007, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
George Tenet and Douglas Feith are both teaching courses at Georgetown University in what "is shaping up as a reproduction in miniature of the Bush administration's titanic struggle over Iraq.... Each is teaching a class that reflects his own worldview and experience in institutions -- the Defense Department [Feith] and the CIA [Tenet] -- that saw the world in starkly different terms." One of the two students taking both classes said that "neither professor used the class to defend his record.... "'I think both of them honestly said there are things they got wrong.... They were both pretty honest.'"
Linzer, Dafna. "A Year Later, Goss's CIA Is Still in Turmoil: Congress to Ask Why Spy Unit Continues to Lose Personnel." Washington Post, 19 Oct. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
CIA Director Porter J. Goss remains "at loggerheads with the clandestine service.... At least a dozen senior officials ... have resigned, retired early or requested reassignment. The directorate's second-in-command walked out of Langley last month and then told senators in a closed-door hearing that he had lost confidence in Goss's leadership."
Linzer, Dafna, and Walter Pincus. "CIA Rejects Discipline for 9/11 Failures: Goss Cites Fear of Hurting Agency." Washington Post, 6 Oct. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 5 October 2005, CIA Director Porter J. Goss said that "[t]he CIA will not seek to hold any current or former agency officials ... responsible for failures leading up to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks,... despite a recommendation by the agency's inspector general that he convene an 'accountability board' to judge their performance."
[CIA/00s/05/IGRep & Gen]
Linzer, Dafna, and Walter Pincus. "Goss Forced Out as CIA Director; Gen. Hayden Is Likely Successor." Washington Post, 6 May 2006, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Porter J. Goss was forced to step down [on 5 May 2006] as CIA director, ending a turbulent 18-month tenure marked by an exodus of some of the agency's top talent and growing White House dissatisfaction with his leadership during a time of war." See also, Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane. "Director of C.I.A. Is Stepping Down Under Pressure," New York Times, 6 May 2006, A1, A11.
[CIA/00s/06/Gen & DCIs/Goss/Resignation]
Linzer, Dafna, and Griff Witte. "U.S. Airstrike Targets Al Qaeda's Zawahiri." Washington Post, 14 Jan. 2006, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 13 January 2006, a CIA Predator drone fired an air-to-ground missile at a compound in Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan. U.S. sources who spoke on the condition of anonymity said that the target was Ayman Zawahiri, second-ranking al Qaeda leader and chief deputy to Osama bin Laden.
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