Le Gallo, André. "Covert Action: A Vital Option in U.S. National Security Policy." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 354-359.
In this "Commentary," the author argues that "[t]he solution to the problems foisted on the U.S. by Radical Islam ... reaches beyond a military-only effort."
Le Gallo, André J. "Forgotten Heroes." Intelligencer 19, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2012): 21-22.
This is a brief tribute to those who fought the war in Laos -- CIA, Air America, Air Force Ravens, and the Hmong.
Leggett, George H. The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police--The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (December 1917 to February 1922). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
According to Pforzheimer, this is "considered to be the definitive book ... on the first formative five years of the Soviet security service." Rocca and Dziak say this "[e]xceptionally well-researched, balanced and informative ... book is a treasure of documentation and insight."
Leggett, Robert E. "The DCI's Center for the Study of Intelligence: Meeting the Challenges of a Changing World Environment." American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 1/2 (1996): 47-51.
The author discusses organization, activities, and challenges of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). Leggett heads the CSI's Community Coordination Group, which oversees and coordinates the Community's historical declassification effort.
LeGro, William E. [COL/USA (Ret.)] "Intelligence in Vietnam after the Cease-Fire." INSCOM Journal 20, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1992).
The author covers the period from his arrival in Vietnam on 2 December 1972 to the fall of Saigon on 29 April 1975. His account of the Intelligence Branch, Defense Attaché Office, Saigon, successor to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, is authoritative.
Lehman, John. "Five Years Later: Are We Any Safer?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 9 (Sep. 2006): 18-22.
The former Secretary of the Navy and 9/11 commission member does not really answer the question raised in the title. Other than that, however, this article is a powerful indictment of how Congress and the White House mishandled the intelligence reform effort. His most pointed criticisms are directed at the FBI ("Our attempt to reform the FBI has failed.") and the failure to create a strong DNI.
[FBI/00s/Gen; FBI/DomSec/00s; GenPostCW/00s/Gen; Reform/00s/Gen]
Lehman, John. "Getting Spy Reform Wrong: Sept. 11 Commission's Proposals Were Turned Into Bureaucratic Bloat." Washington Post, 16 Nov. 2005, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Clark comment: Although I will often disagree with the views of the former Secretary of the Navy and 9/11 commission member, Lehman's basic thrust here is on the mark.
"The [9/11] commission had a straightforward vision: We wanted a strong national intelligence director to smash bureaucratic layers, tear down information 'stovepipes' and rewrite personnel policy to bring in the best people ... to act quickly and decisively on the president's priorities.... [I]nstead of the lean structure recommended by the commission, with a small but powerful staff based on just three deputies (one each for foreign, domestic and military intelligence), the administration reached all the way back to the McNamara years to create a huge new staff to sit on top of the old and still bloated bureaucracies. The result is that little has changed -- except that a new bureaucracy has been created."
Lehman, John. Making War: The 200-Year-Old Battle Between the President and Congress Over How America Goes to War. New York: Scribner's, 1992.
MI 20.2: Lehman "draws on historical examples dating from Barbary Coast Pirates to Desert Storm. [His] research is exceptional, and the footnotes provide many valuable resources."
Treverton, FA 71 (Summer 1992), says that "[t]his engaging essay, part memoir, begins with Desert Storm and ends with Panama, with constitutional theory and history in between. Lehman ... is wise enough to recognize that the Constitution hardly settled the tussle over war powers.... He is also honest enough to admit that while he favors a strong president in principle, he tends, like most of us, to look more favorably on Congress. Lehman emphasizes the leverage of congressional investigation..., and he concludes that Congress' power of the purse has been roughly the check on executive discretion that the Founding Fathers had in mind."
[GenPostwar/NatSec/90s; Oversight/90s; Overviews/U.S./90s]
LeHockey, John D.
1. "Are We Deceiving Anyone?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 115 (Sep. 1989): 53-56. [Seymour]
2. "Silence: Golden for Us -- Deadly for Them." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 115 (Nov. 1988): 73-77. [Seymour]
LeHockey, John D. Strategic and Operational Military Deception: U.S. Marines and the Next Twenty Years. Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1990. [Seymour]
[MI/Deception & Marines][c]
Leiby, Richard. "Declassified Documents Show NSA Listened in on MLK, Muhammad Ali and Art Buchwald," Washington Post, 25 Sep. 2013. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to newly declassified NSA documents released on 25 September 2013, from 1967 to 1973, NSA's Minaret program "tapped the overseas communications of war critics," including Martin Luther King Jr., Whitney Young, Muhammad Ali, Senators Frank Church and Howard Baker, and journalists Art Buchwald, and Tom Wicker.
Leiby, Richard, and Karen DeYoung. "Pakistan Names New Spymaster." Washington Post, 9 Mar. 2012. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 9 March 2012, "Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced ... that Karachi-based Lt. Gen. Zaheer ul-Islam will head Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), replacing Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who has led the agency since 2008."
Leiby, Richard, and Karen DeYoung. "U.S. Drone Strikes Resume in Pakistan; Action May Complicate Vital Negotiations." Washington Post, 29 Apr. 2012. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 29 April 2012, "CIA drone missiles hit militant targets in Pakistan ... for the first time in a month." The strikes "killed four al-Qaeda-linked fighters in a girls' school they had taken over in the North Waziristan tribal area, security officials there said." In a statement, Pakistan "called the attacks illegal and 'violative of its territorial integrity and sovereignty.'"
[CIA/10s/12; OtherCountries/Pakistan; Terrorism/12]
Leiby, Richard, and Walter Pincus. "Ex-Envoy: Nuclear Report Ignored; Iraqi Purchases Were Doubted by CIA." Washington Post, 6 Jul. 2003, A13. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Joseph C. Wilson, the retired U.S. ambassador "whose CIA-directed mission to Niger in early 2002 helped debunk claims that Iraq had tried to obtain uranium there for nuclear weapons," said on 6 July 2003 "that U.S. and British officials ignored his findings and exaggerated the public case for invading Iraq."
Leide, John A. [MAJGEN/USA] "The Defense Attache System: Challenges and Opportunities for the 1990s." Defense Intelligence Journal 1, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 193-203.
Leide, John A. [MAJGEN/USA] "Defense HUMINT: A Challenge for the 90s." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (Autumn-Winter 1993-1994): 15- 16.
Leidig, Michael. "Former Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Is Killed in Shoot-Out with Police." Telegraph (London), 17 Sep. 1999. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
According to Vienna police on 16 September 1999, "Horst Meyer, a former Baader-Meinhof terrorist wanted in connection with the murder of the Deutsche Bank chief Alfred Herrhausen in 1989, has been shot dead and his companion [Andrea Klump] arrested."
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