Koh - Koq


Koh, B.C. "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective." Asian Survey 9 (Apr. 1969): 264-280. [Petersen]


Koh, Harold Hongju. The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. KF4651/.K64

According to Valcourt, IJI&C 4.2, Koh is a Yale law professor and former adviser in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice. "The Iran-Contra affair constituted a 'fundamental interbranch dispute over what the rule of law governing national security should be.'... Congress perhaps did not 'so much misdefine its institutional task as leave it unfinished." The National Security Constitution "consists of the U.S. Constitution and several legislative enactments pertaining to foreign policy.... [M]ost presidents have misused this [military and intelligence] power by committing U.S. forces to overt or covert action without having obtained sufficient consensus from Congress and the public." This is a "thoughtful book on the current state of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches."

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran-Contra; GenPostwar/NatSec/90s; Oversight/90s]

Kohler, Robert. The Intelligence Industrial Base: Doomed to Extinction? Working Group on Intelligence Reform Series. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994. "Adapted" version. American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 2 (Autumn-Winter 1994): 85-91.

Kohler, Robert.

1. "One Officer's Perspective: The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 2 (2002): 13-20. National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice (2005-U1): 35-44. [A scanned version is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/journal/index.html]

The former Director of the CIA's Office of Development and Engineering (OD&E) argues that "the NRO today is a shadow of its former self. Its once outstanding expertise in system engineering has drastically eroded. This article explores the dissolving relationship between the NRO and the CIA, which traditionally supplied a major portion of the organization's technical expertise. It provides a perspective on key issues as the NRO faces tough decisions and an uncertain future."

For a response from NRO's Deputy Director, see Dennis Fitzgerald, "Commentary on 'The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office': NRO Leadership Replies," Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 2 (2002), or National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice (2005-U1): 45-49 [A scanned version is available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/journal/index.html]

2. "Recapturing What Made the NRO Great: Updated Observations on 'The Decline of the NRO.'" National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice (2005-U1): 51-57. [A scanned version is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/journal/index.html]

NRO's establishment as a Joint Venture between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the CIA "was recognition that not only the DoD and the CIA needed intelligence from space, but other elements of the USG did as well. Further, it was realized that the USG could not afford to have every department build its own reconnaissance systems; therefore, a national approach was needed.... The new DNI needs to insure that the DoD not end up owning the NRO and needs to reestablish a proper balance between the DoD and the IC in forming NRO requirements and priorities."

In addition, "[t]he CIA needs to make a conscious decision on its continued participation in the NRO. Currently, only 25% of the total CIA contingent in the NRO are engineer/scientist/program management personnel. The rest are administrative types. The CIA should not be the administrative arm of what is increasingly becoming a DoD organization."

See Dennis Fitzgerald, "Commentary on Kohler's 'Recapturing What Made the NRO Great: Updated Observations on "The Decline of the NRO,"'" National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice (2005-U1): 59-66 [A scanned version is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/journal/index.html], for additional comments from NRO's Deputy Director.

3. See Edmund H. Nowinski and Robert J. Kohler, "The Lost Art of Program Management in the Intelligence Community," Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (2006): 33-46, for additional thoughts on managing large, complex programs, specifically those of the NRO.


Kohli, M.S., and Kenneth Conboy. Spies in the Himalayas: Secret Missions and Perilous Climbs. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2003.

Umansky, Washington Post, 16 Mar. 2003, notes that this book tells the "repeatedly jaw-dropping" story of the efforts of "a joint team of the best American and Indian mountain climbers" to plant high in the Himalayas a device to monitor Chinese nuclear tests. Kohli led the Indian half of the expedition.

For Goodman, I&NS 18.4, this "is effectively a memoir" of Kohli's experiences. It "is a very readable and very enjoyable account of a hitherto heavily classified mission." Wales, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, May 2003 [http://www.h-net.org], says that this "is not a particularly scintillating read," as it is burdened with "plodding prose." In addition, "the story is narrowly focused and there is little historiographic background.... Nevertheless, there are several vignettes in Spies that will fascinate students of intelligence history."

[CIA/60s/Gen; OtherCountries/India]

Kohnen, David. Commanders Winn and Knowles: Winning the U-Boat War with Intelligence, 1939-1943. Krakow, Poland: The Enigma Bulletin, No. 4, Special Issue, 1999. [pb]

According to information from Mark Friedman (http://www.mariner.org), Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve Commander Rodger Winn and U.S. Navy Commander Kenneth Knowles of the U.S. Navy's "F-21 Atlantic Section" were at the "strategic core" of the Allied naval effort in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Kruh, Cryptologia 24.1, says that "Kohnen has written an excellent account of British-American naval strategies, relations between their leaders, and he includes many cryptologic details and information about the codebreakers involved." For Rohwer, JIH 1.1, "[w]e must be very grateful to David Kohnen for reminding us of the development of the American-British-Canadian SIGINT cooperation and especially for providing us with a vivid description of Rodger Winn and Kenneth Knowles."


Kolasky, Bob. "Down, But Not Out." IntellectualCapital.com, 18 Jun. 1998. [http://www.intellectualcapital.com]

The topic here is the current state of the U.S. intelligence community. Whatever this article has to offer in the way of commentary is submerged by some egregious mistakes: Adm. David Jeremiah is not "the acting director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)"; Sen. Bob Kerrey is not a Republican from Nebraska; and in discussing the intelligence budget, declaring that "the official number is classified" at this late date is shoddy research at best.


Kolodziej, Edward A. Security and International Relations. Themes in International Relations Series. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Wallace, IN&S 23.2 (Apr. 2008), sees this as "a credible attempt to ... provide an introduction for graduate students to security studies as a subfield of international relations.... This book ... is well-organized but focused at the graduate level and assumes readers are well grounded in both political science and international relations."


Komatsu, Keiichiro. Origins of the Pacific War and the Importance of "Magic." New York: St. Martin's, 1999.

According to Kruh, Cryptologia 24.3, this is a "scholarly examination of Japan-U.S. relations in the twentieth century leading to the outbreak of the Pacific War.... [The author] shows how mistranslations of Magic messages produced significant elements of misunderstanding, followed by mistrust and deep suspicion. He believes it suggests the war could have been averted." For Boyd, I&NS 16.3, the author convincingly demonstrates the existence of mistranslations, but also overstates their strategic importance.

Kislenko, H-Diplo, Mar. 2001, and Intelligencer 12.1, finds that Origins of the Pacific War "offers much to the continuing debate on the U.S.-Japanese war. The book is immaculate in detail, and draws upon a wide array of both English and Japanese language sources. There is a good historiographical essay, an extensive bibliography, a very useful list of important MAGIC mistranslations, and a large selection of period diplomatic communications in both Japanese and English.... [This] is must-read for those interested in U.S.-Japanese relations, or the role that intelligence plays in shaping decision-making."

[Interwar/U.S.; WWII/Magic]

Komer, R.W. The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf]

This study "focuses on the structure and control -- and their effect on policy and performance -- of an actual counterinsurgency effort."


Komisar, Lucy. "Turkey's Terrorists: A CIA Legacy Lives On." The Progressive, Apr. 1997, 24-27.

According to the author, the CIA ended its funding of stay-behind organizations in Turkey in the 1970s. However, the organizations remained in place and spearheaded rightist attacks on leftist groups and individuals.

[CA/ME; OtherCountries/Turkey]

Konovalov, A.A., and V.S. Sokolov. "Meeting with Agents." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 2 (Spring 1964): 65-91.

"This article is adapted from a paper issued under Top Secret classification by the Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army, Department of Special Training." (p. 65/fn.1)


Koppes, Clayton R., and Gregory D. Black. "What to Show the World: The Office of War Information and Hollywood, 1942-1945." Journal of American History 64 (1977): 87-105. [Winkler]


Return to K Table of Contents

Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents