Koc - Kog


Koch, Andrew. "Briefing: Psychological Operations." Jane's Defence Weekly 36 (15 Aug. 2001): 22-26.


Koch, Andrew. "US Air Force Refines Information Operations." Jane's Defence Weekly 41 (2 Jun. 2004): 10.


Koch, Andrew. "US Eyes Improved Psyops Delivery." Jane's Defence Weekly 42 (16 Feb. 2005): 11.

Among the improvements mentioned is the Psyops Global Reach program, which is designed to develop and field systems capable of sending radio and television signals deep into enemy territory.


Koch, James R. "Operation FORTITUDE: The Backbone of Deception." Military Review 72 (Mar. 1992): 66-77.

Sexton: "Analytic history of the Normandy deception and its supporting radio deception plan."


Koch, Oscar W. [BGEN/USA], with Robert G. Hays. G-2: Intelligence for Patton. Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing Co., 1971.

See "Oscar Koch and the Confidence of the Commander" at the Huachuca History Program under "Masters of the Intelligence Art": http://www.huachuca.army.mil/sites/History/PDFS/MKOCH.PDF.

According to Pforzheimer, Koch was Patton's G-2 from the start-up of planning for the invasion of Sicily through the end of the war in Europe. "He relates his experiences ... in a highly readable fashion." However, publication predates the revelations about Ultra; therefore, the book does not include discussion of the role of communications intelligence on Patton's decisions. Constantinides notes that "[a]ccounts by U.S. Army intelligence officers at Koch's level of responsibility in World War II are rare."

See also, Robert Hays, Patton's Oracle: Gen. Oscar Koch, as I Knew Him -- A Biographical Memoir (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013).

Peake, Studies 57.4 (Dec. 2013), identifies this work as "the only biography of a WWII G-2."


Koch, R.W. "The CIA's Death Valley Albatross." Air Classics 15 (Apr. 1979): 68-73, 98.

Petersen: "USAF support for CIA operations."


Koch, Scott A. "The Role of US Army Military Attachés Between the World Wars: Selection and Training." Studies in Intelligence 38, no 5 (1995): 111-115.

"There is no evidence that attaché reports influenced either American weapons development or strategic planning before the war." At least part of the problem can be found in the Army's generally negative attitude toward Military Intelligence Division (MID) and in the generally correct belief that combat command promised greater opportunities for a successful military career. In addition, attachés received little more than "superficial instruction in codes and finance."


Koch, Scott A. "Zendebad, Shah!" The Central Intelligence Adency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953. Washington, DC: History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Jun. 1998. [Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran980600.pdf]

The heavily redacted nature of this work makes it difficult to read and impossible to maintain continuity. Nonetheless, it is necessary reading for anyone interested in the events in Iran in 1953.


Koch, Scott A., ed. CIA Cold War Records: Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993.

MacPherson, I&NS 11.2: There are 27 documents assembled here, culled from a larger collection still to be declassified. The reviewer concludes that "it can be inferred from the trends evident in these documents that BNE [Board of National Estimates] assembled its estimates without pandering to policymakers' preconceptions."


Koch, Scott A., and Brian D. Fila. "Our First Line of Defense": Presidential Reflections on U.S. Intelligence. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996.

This is a selection of Presidential remarks on intelligence, including statements by Washington, Polk, Wilson, FDR, and all the presidents since.


Koch, Stephen. Double Lives: Spies and Writers in the Secret Soviet War of Ideas Against the West. New York: Free Press, 1993. Double Lives: Stalin, Willi Münzenberg and the Seduction of the Intellectuals. London: HarperCollins, 1994. Rev. ed. New York: Enigma Books, 2004.

Kochavi, Noam. "Washington's View of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1961-63: From Puzzle Prudence to Bold Experimentation." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 50-79.


Kochba, Moshe Bar [MAJGEN/IDF]. "Deception: The Predisposed Lie." IDF Journal 21 (Fall 1990): 12-17. [Seymour]


Koc-Menard, Sergio. "Australia's Intelligence and Passenger Assessment Programs." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 218-236.

The author discusses Australia's Advanced Passenger Processing (APP) System. The system allows air carriers to conduct pre-boarding passenger screening at overseas locations.


Koehl, Stuart L., and Stephen P. Glick. "Why the Rescue Failed." American Spectator 13 (Jul 1980): 23-25.


Koehler, John O. Spies in the Vatican: The Soviet Union's War against the Catholic Church. New York: Pegasus, 2009.

Goulden, Washington Times, 6 Sep. 2009, and Intelligencer 17.2 (Fall 2009), finds that the author "identifies by name a staggering number of priests who spied on their own masters, either because of blackmail or ideological weaknesses.... But there were Vatican [counterintelligence] successes as well." This is a "must-read that ranks with [Koehler's] earlier book on the Stasi." Peake, Studies 54.2 (Jun. 2010) and Intelligencer 18.1 (Fall-Winter 2010), notes the author's conclusion that the "Soviet Union, with Bulgarian cooperation, was the force behind the attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II."

[OtherCountries/Vatican; Russia/45-89]

Koehler, John O. STASI: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999. New York: Basic Books, 2000. [pb]

Jonkers, AFIO WIN 6-99 (10 Feb. 1999), recommends this book that "reviews Stasi activities within East and West Germany, ranging from internal repression to international espionage, terrorism, and clandestine operations, extending as far afield as Latin America and Africa." For Bates, NIPQ 15.3, this is a "fine description of a Cold War enemy, made possible by the declassification of a massive amount of material."

To Adams, IJI&C 14.3, this work conveys "some important and first-hand testimony," but "falls well short of the authoritative studies emerging from Germany these past few years." Murphy, I&NS 14.3, would have preferred that Koehler stay closer to the information he received from Col. Rainer Wiegand, a senior MfS counterintelligence officer who defected in 1990, rather than use the less accurate material obtained from other sources.

Fisher, Washington Post, 13 Apr. 1999, says that Koehler's is a "sometimes riveting but choppy and angry survey" of the Stasi. In addition, "there is precious little distinction drawn in this book between well-documented instances of Stasi support for Palestinian terrorism and Sandinista Nicaraguan police, espionage and terror on the one hand, and rank rumor on the other." Overall, the book "reads ... like an ideological tract, replete with feverish language, selective evidence and a political agenda so consuming as to strip some very good investigative work of its impact."

An anonymous reviewer in CIRA Newsletter 23.4 calls this "a 'must' reference volume for one's intelligence library." It is "more operationally detailed" than Childs and Popplewell's The Stasi (1996), but is also "a bit uneven in depth." Additionally, the author "might ... have been ... less coy about his sourcing." Schmitz, CIRA Newsletter 24.4, finds Koehler's book to be "an important source of information on the later period of the life of the MfS" but "very weak in its coverage of the first 20 years of the HVA's existence." In addition, the "book contains some factual errors and what may be proofreading flaws."


Koenker, Diane P., and Ronald D. Bachman, eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives: Documents in English Translation. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1997.

These documents became available through a collaborative arrangement between the Library of Congress and the Russian Committee for Archival Affairs.


Kofos, Evangelos. Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878. Salonika, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975.

According to Constantinides, the intelligence connection here is the discussion of Greek covert activities in Ottoman territories with a Greek population. This is a "scholarly, balanced work."


Return to K Table of Contents

Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents