Ken - Keq


Kennan, George F. "The Sisson Documents." Journal of Modern History 28 (Jun. 1956): 130-154. [Petersen]


Kennedy, Claudia J. "Army Intelligence: Improving Support to Commanders." Army, Oct. 1997, 129-132.


Kennedy, David, and Leslie Brunetta. "Lebanon and the Intelligence Community: A Case Study." Studies in Intelligence 37, no. 5 (1994): 37-51.

"This article is an abridged version of a case written in 1988 at the Kennedy School of Government."

[GenPostwar/80s/Gen; OtherCountries/Arab/Lebanon]

Kennedy, David, ed. Sunshine and Shadow: The CIA and the Soviet Economy. Case Study C16-91-1096.0. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994.


Kennedy, Dominic. "CIA Must Give Its Diana File to Al Fayed." Times (London), 10 Feb. 1999.

A judge on the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia has ordered DIA and CIA to hand over materials they are holding about Diana, Princess of Wales, to Mohamed Al Fayed. "The National Security Agency has conceded that it had '39 NSA-originated and NSA-controlled documents' about the Princess. They were classified top secret because their disclosure could 'cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security', and a judge in Maryland declined a previous request for their release saying that such a move would be extremely ill-advised."


Kennedy, Gregory C. "Intelligence and the Blockade, 1914-17: A Study in Administration, Friction and Command." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 5 (Oct. 2007): 699-721.

"Without the constant acquisition and provision of accurate and timely intelligence, commanders of the Blockade strategy ... would have been blind to ... key issues. Blockade intelligence saw the most sophisticated and wide-ranging intelligence assessment acitivities ever done to that date."


Kennedy, Gregory C. "The Royal Navy, Intelligence and the Spanish Civil War: Lessons in Air Power, 1936-39." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 238-263.

"[N]either the RAF nor the RN were clear on what data was a priority or why.... Departmental stovepipes prevented the horizontal flow of information and intelligence, reflecting an uncoordinated and inefficient system of organization as well as a distinctly antiqated view of modern warfare with its need for accurate technical information to facilitate war planning."


Kennedy, Ludovic. The Trial of Stephen Ward. London: Gollancz, 1964. [Chambers]


Kennedy, Michael. Guarding Neutral Ireland: The Coast Watching Service and Military Intelligence, 1939-1945. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008.

White and Riley, Irish Studies in International Affairs 19 (2008), find that the author's "major point is that this service contributed valuable intelligence to the Irish government during the war. Much of this information was shared with the Allies. As Ireland was drawn into the air and naval battles that surrounded and crossed its territory during the war, the Irish clearly sided with the Allies. For Kennedy, Irish neutrality was a formality that underestimates the important role Ireland played in assisting the Allies in their effort against the Germans."

[OtherCountries/Ireland/WWII; WWII/Atlantic]

Kennedy, Michael. "'Men that Came in with the Sea': The Coast Watching Service and the Sinking of the Arandora Star." History Ireland 16, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2008): 26-29.


Kennedy, Padraic C. "The Secret Service Department: A British Intelligence Bureau in Mid-Victorian London, September 1867 to April 1868." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 100-127.

"Although the authorities had seriously overestimated the threats to England's security in late 1867, their efforts to establish and disband the Secret Service Department represented a pragmatic approach to the perceived crisis."


Kennedy, Robert. Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008.

Peake, Studies 53.4 (Dec. 2009), says that the author has provided what is essentially "a primer for management or people new to the problems of intelligence." This work "clearly identifies the problems facing the Intelligence Community.... The exception, is counterintelligence, a topic he doesn't mention. Nevertheless, for an overview of what intelligence management faces, it is a good start."

For McCarthy, IN&S 25.2 (Apr. 2010), there are no "startling revelations" in this book. However, it does give readers "a nuanced view of the elusive intelligence cycle." The reviewer would have preferred to have seen the author use "a wider range of sources. For instance, he is far too reliant on Stansfield Turner's Burn Before Reading when describing the views and motivations of former CIA directors."


Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Norton, 1969.


Kennedy Shaw, W.B. Long Range Desert Group. London: Stackpole, 1990. Rev. ed. London: Greenhill, 2000.

According to Kelly, I&NS 16.1, this account by the unit's intelligence officer was first published in 1945 and takes the story of the LRDG only through the end of the war in Africa. Because of the absence of references to Ultra, the reviewer suggests that this work be read along with John Gordon, The Other Desert War (1987).


Kenner, Barry. Guarding Neutral Ireland: The Coast Watching Service and Military Intelligence, 1939-1945. Dublin: Four Courts, 2008.


Kenney, Michael C. "Intelligence Games: Comparing the Intelligence Capabilities of Law Enforcement Agencies and Drug Trafficking Enterprises." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 212-243.

"While non-state criminal enterprises cannot match the technological sophistication of drug enforcement and intelligence agencies, they possess important advantages over their state adversaries, including the clandestine nature of narcotics trafficking, flatter decisionmaking hierarchies, and fewer bureaucratic restraints to action."


Kent, Sherman.

Kenyon, Henry S. "Unconventional Information Operations Shorten Wars." Signal, Aug. 2003. []

According to Maj. Gen. Paul J. LeBras, USAF, commander of the Air Force Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) and Joint Information Operations Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, "information operations embrace a spectrum of effects-based missions from psychological operations and system security to intelligence gathering and infiltrating enemy communications networks. The success of recent U.S. military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq has raised awareness about the value of this approach."

[GenPostwar/InfoWar; MI/AF]

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