K., Damien. "Medical Intelligence Relies on Teamwork." Pathfinder (Mar.-Apr. 2010). [https://www1.nga.mil/Newsroom/Pathfinder/mar_apr_10/Pages/Medical.aspx#]
This article in the unclassified NGA house organ discusses the work of the NGA Support Team (NST) with the DIA's National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI). The author is chief of the NST at the NCMI.
Kadane, Kathy. "Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesians." San Francisco Examiner, 20 May 1990. [http://www.pir.org/kadane.html]
"The U.S. government played a significant role in one of the worst massacres of the century by supplying the names of thousands of Communist Party leaders to the Indonesian army, which hunted down the leftists and killed them, former U.S. diplomats say.... Approval for the release of the names came from the top U.S. Embassy officials, including former Ambassador Marshall Green, deputy chief of mission Jack Lydman and political section chief Edward Masters, the three acknowledged in interviews."
In "A Letter to the Editor," New York Review of Books, 10 Apr. 1997, Kadane adds that the above-mentioned "on-the-record, taped interviews..., my notes, and a small collection of documents, including a few declassified cables..., [have been transferred] to the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C.."
Kagan, Donald. "Why America Dropped the Bomb." Commentary, 100 (Sep. 1995), 17-23.
Auer and Halloran, Parameters (Spring 1996), say that the author "is masterful in refuting the 'new revisionist consensus' that the bomb was neither necessary nor a morally acceptable means to end the war."
Kagan, Mark H. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Relays Pictures to Airborne Radar System." Signal, May 1999, 61 ff. [http://www.us.net/signal]
Kagan, Robert. A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990. New York: Free Press, 1996.
Hendrickson, FA 75.4 (Jul.-Aug. 1996), calls this book a "brilliant and encyclopedic history of the American intervention in Nicaragua." Kagan, a midlevel State Department official during the Reagan administration, approaches the subject "from the more detached and objective station of the historian, and his literary gifts make the work appealing despite its oppressive length."
Kahan, Jerome H., and Anne K. Long. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Study of Its Strategic Context." Political Science Quarterly 87 (Dec, 1972): 564-590.
Kahan, Stuart. The Wolf of the Kremlin. London: Robert Hale, 1989.
This biography of Kaganovich offers insights into the Terror and the relationship between Stalin and the OGPU/NKVD.
Kahaner, Larry. Competitive Intelligence. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.
According to Library Journal, 15 Mar. 1997, the author "views competitive intelligence as a tool of national economic sovereignty as well as corporate market success." Kahaner compares the small percentage of large U.S. firms that have formal intelligence operations with the Japanese, "for whom competitive intelligence has been part of national industrial strategy since World War II." Oros, I&NS 14.3, notes that while Japan may be the author's "paragon of the use of competitive intelligence in busines, he is not uncritical of Japanese practices." In particular, Kahaner contrasts the Japanese strength in intelligence with a weakness in analysis.
Kahin, Audrey R., and George McT. Kahin. Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New York: New Press, 1995.
Warren, Surveillant 4.3, comments that "[t]he writing is awkward, the thesis untenable, and the evidence missing. If one can separate the tendentious chaff from the straightforward wheat, however, it's not a bad description of the Indonesian rebellion in the late 1950s." Nevertheless, the Kahins are stretching when they try "to implicate the Eisenhower administration in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians in 1965 as an outgrowth of American support for the rebellion."
As a counterpoint, Hess, JAH 83.1, appears to swallow the Kahin line whole, terming this a "singularly important book." This view is shared, at least in part, by Lucas, I&NS 12.3, who sees the Kahins "skilfully" uncovering the Eisenhower administration's "heavy-handed resort to secret operations" and providing "a fascinating account of a policy gone wrong."
Two former CIA officers who served in Indonesia, Collins and Tovar, IJI&C 9.3, note that George Kahin "is regarded by many as America's leading apologist for former Indonesian President Sukarno." Therefore, it is not unexpeced that they find "serious flaws in this book, not the least of which is a stridency militating against any pretension to objectivity.... [T]here is no credible evidence to support [the authors'] thesis that the U.S. 'provoked' the 1958 rebellion." In addition, "the Kahins greatly inflate the size and scope of the U.S. covert and military forces involved in Indonesia." The reviewers conclude that this book is an "essentially failed exercise of allegation and innuendo."
IJI&C 10.2 carries the Kahins' response, "CIA's Men Disingenuous," to the Collins-Tovar review, and separate counter-responses by Tovar and Collins. In their discussion, the Kahins reiterate that "we have not been reticent in averring that American officials were supportive of the Suharto forces' physical elimination of those they charged with communism." And therein lies the rub.
In another context, Tovar, IJI&C 14.4, comments that "[t]he Kahins and their partisans have done their best to show U.S. involvement with the army in the Gestapu coup attempt, this being the alleged culmination of relations with the army dating back to 1958. That is nonsense, as is the contention that the coup attempt was 'an internal army affair.'"
Kahlili, Reza [Pseud.] A Time to Betray: The Astonishing Double Life of a CIA Agent Inside the Revolutionary Guards of Iran. New York: Threshold Editions, 2010.
According to Peake, Studies 54.3 (Sep. 2010) and Intelligencer 18.1 (Fall-Winter 2010), the author grew up in Iran, attended USC in the 1970s, returned to Iran and joined the Revolutionary Guards after the Shah's fall, became disillusioned by the nature of the new regime, and fled Iran for the United States. Recruited by the CIA, he returned to Iran and became an agent in place until he again fled in the 1990s.
Kahn, Jeffrey. "The Case of Colonel Abel." Journal of National Security Law & Policy 5, no. 1 (2011): 263-301. [http://www.jnslp.com]
The author uses the Abel case to make points relevant to the habeas cases of detainees held at Guantánamo Bay.
Kahn, Martin. "Assessing an Ally and Potential Enemy: U.S. Estimates of Soviet War Potential During World War II." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 4 (Winter 2014): 720-751.
Kaiser, David. "Review Article: Conspiracy or Cock-up? Pearl Harbor Revisited." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 354-372.
Clausen and Lee's Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement is a "highly readable book." Much of what Clausen "uncovered late in the war ... has been ignored." Nevertheless, "[l]awyers ... acquire the habit of working to prove a particular point.... Readers must therefore approach his account with caution." Neither Rusbridger and Nave nor Layton "have been able to prove that anyone had real information warning of a Pearl Harbor attack.... [T]he behavior of the Washington authorities suggests that they believed that they had given field commanders enough warning of impending hostilities, and for the most part, the record backs them up.... Th[e] evidence ... suggests that General Short simply did not regard an attack upon Hawaii as a serious possibility.... To the unbiased, reflective historian, five decades after the event, the Pearl Harbor attack exemplifies the difficult of anticipating surprise, the mistakes which individuals inevitably make, the ease with which governments fail to make use of available information, and the relative unimportance, in the long run, of winning the opening battle of a war." (Italics in original)
Kaiser, David. The Road to Dallas: The Assassination of John F. Kennedy. Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2008.
After noting that the author is a "reputable, experienced historian," McAdams, Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), judges this work to be "a clanking, Rube Goldberg-style conspiracy contraption that falls of its own weight.... Kaiser has a penchant ... for the most unreliable evidence and the most implausible scenarios.... One could go on ad nauseam about the mistakes in interpretation, outright errors, fallacies, and gaps in logic or fact which appear on virtually every page."
As an old Cuba hand, Chapman, IJI&C 23.3 (Fall 2010), places "much of what [he] read" in this book into the "Cuba context" of the day: "talk, talk, and only talk." Chapman warns the reader not to look for "empirical evidence" in Kaiser's presentation. There are too many "may have," "claimed," "heard," and the like attached to the books most provocative sentences.
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