Arthur S. Hulnick

A - I


See interview of Hulnick at Susan Seligson, "CIA Veteran Hulnick Slams Agency's Critics: CAS Prof Calls Popular Image of Spy Agency Nonsense," Intelligencer 17, no. 3 (Winter-Spring 2010): 51-53. Originally carried by "Boston University Today in the World," 22 January 2010.

Hulnick, Arthur S. "The Ames Case: HOW Could It Happen?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 133-154.

Hulnick, Arthur S. "CIA's Relations with Academia: Symbiosis Not Psychosis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 4 (Winter 1986-87): 41-50.


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Determining U.S. Intelligence Policy." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 211-224.


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Dirty Tricks for Profit: Covert Action in Private Industry." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 4 (Winter 2001-2002): 529-544.

"[T]here are many parallels between intelligence in government and similar activity in the private sector. But the differences are significant."


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Does the U.S. Intelligence Community Need a DNI?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 710-730.

Writing prior to enactment of the legislation creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the author stated "whether the President's proposals would give the new DNI sufficient authority to institute other changes that would make the system function according to the needs of the new era in national and homeland security is not clear."


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Espionage: Does It Have a Future in the 21st Century?" Brown Journal of World Affairs 11, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 165-173.


Hulnick, Arthur S. Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999.

Clark comment: Despite its title, this book is not focused on reform issues; it is, instead, a contender for adoption as a text for a college course in intelligence or as a supplemental text in a broader national security course. Despite the qualms expressed about the work by CIA critics, it fulfills the textbook need admirably.

Robert David Steele provides the following comments: "This book has two good features -- the author really does understand the personnel issues, and hence one can read between the lines for added value; and the book is as good an 'insider' tour of the waterfront as one could ask for. How the book treats the CIA-FBI relationship, for example, is probably representative of how most CIA insiders feel. The book does not reflect a deep understanding of open sources and tends to accept the common wisdom across the intelligence bureaucracy, that all is 'generally okay' and just a bit of change on the margin is necessary. In this respect, it is a good benchmark against which the more daring reformist books may be measured."

Melvin Goodman, Washington Monthly, Mar. 2000, 54-55, can find little good to say about Hulnick's work: "Hulnick ... spent 28 years in the CIA and his new book reads very much like he's still in it"; "the reader confronts a generally out-of-date review of the various functions of the CIA and the intelligence community in America"; and "systemic problems receive little scrutiny from Hulnick and he leaves major issues unaddressed."

Wirtz, IJI&C 13.2, has a more positive view of Fixing the Spy Machine. He sees the work as a "lively overview of the workings" of the U.S. Intelligence Community and "a highly accessible and balanced assessment of the dilemmas created by the presence of secret organizations in American democracy." Wirtz does suggest, however, that the "information revolution" is confronting the CIA with "a deeper crisis than Mr. Hulnick recognizes."

[Overviews/U.S./90s; Reform/00s/Gen][c]

Hulnick, Arthur S. "Home Time: A New Paradigm for Domestic Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 569-585.

The author provides one of his continuing looks at homeland security, and finds that some progress has been made. However, delivery of "both unevaluated and finished intelligence products" remains a "major hurdle." His conclusion: "The existing conglomerate system can do the job, and has made great strides in the right direction."


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Indications and Warning for Homeland Security: Seeking a New Paradigm." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 593-608.

"[N]ew methods for warning of a terrorist attack need to be developed. The old I&W system, which is still useful in watching for changes that affect the U.S., doesn't need to change, but recognition is necessary that it doesn't work against terrorism.... [F]or the foreseeable future, the warning paradigm is not likely to emerge from the DHS itself, but will instead have to wait until changes and reforms in the broader U.S. intelligence system are put into place."


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1992): 455-465.


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Intelligence and Law Enforcement: The 'Spies Are Not Cops' Problem." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 269-286.

The author looks at some of the problems inherent in the relationship between intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, and specifically between the CIA and FBI. He notes a growing degree of cooperation between the two in counterintelligence and other areas since the Ames case, but clearly sees that differences remain and are likely to continue to do so. He believes there is a need for a "permanent body to adjudicate issues of tasking, warrants, and the like."


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Intelligence Producer-Consumer Relations in the Electronic Era." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 4 (Winter 2011-2012): 747-756.

This is a quick and useful look at this longstanding issue in the electronic era. Hulnick's conclusion: "[M]odern electronic systems have solved some intelligence problems but have created new ones. Clearly electronics has sped up some collection and delivery systems, but shortened the time available to analysts for making sense out of an increasingly large and complex set of incoming data. Electronics cannot help predict the future any more than older systems could. Thus, the basic conundrums of intelligence reamin the same as always."


Hulnick, Arthur S. "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach." Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 2 (May 1986): 212-233.

The author points out that the intelligence producer-policy consumer relationship is not one of a single linkage but, rather, consists of "many intersections between the two systems." He also lays down some "rules" that policy-support intelligence must follow if it expects to have an impact on the policy process.


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Intelligence Reform 2007: Fix or Fizzle?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 567-582.

This is another well-considered addition to the author's body of work. Hulnick notes that "[i]n many respects, the results [of post-9/11 reforms] have not been what the reformers had planned." The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 "destroyed some aspects of the [intelligence] system that might better have been left untouched.... A major problem in the reform legislation was its giving the DNI considerable responsibility with little real power and authority." Hulnick's conclusion: "The result is disappointing.... But, no real damage has been done either."


Hulnick, Arthur S. "Intelligence Reform 2008: Where to from Here?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 4 (Winter 2008-2009): 621-634.

Hulnick is vivid and mostly on the mark with his analysis of where intelligence is and where it should be going. It is particularly interesting to this reader that he has left the ranks of those supporting the inclusion of collectors and analysis under the same organizational roof. He states: "Given the Agency's reluctance to meld operations and analysis, I have to agree that perhaps ... a separate analytic agency might be a good alternative."


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