Hes - Hh


Hesketh, Roger. Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. London: St Ermin's, 1999. New York: Overlook, 2000.

Cohen, FA 79.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2000), says that this "tale of espionage and counterespionage, meticulous planning and organization, and applied psychology used for the highest stakes ... is simply superb." The author, one of the top officials in the London Controlling Station, wrote the work immediately after the end of the war as Fortitude's official history.


Heslop, Richard. Xavier: The Famous British Agent's Dramatic Account of His Work in the French Resistance. London: Hart-Davis, 1970. London: Mayflower, 1971. [pb]

[UK/WWII/Services/SOE; WWII/Eur/Fr]

Hess, James [CW3/USA], and Curtis R. Friedel. "Applying Critical Thinking to Intelligence Analysis." American Intelligence Journal 26, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 31-44.

This article presents "Facione's (1990) critical thinking skills and how they may be applied to the processes used for intelligence analysis."


Hess, Pamela.

Hess, Sigurd. "The British Baltic Fishery Protection Service (BBFPS) and the Clandestine Operations of Hans Helmut Klose 1949-1956." Journal of Intelligence History 1, no. 2 (Winter 2001). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]

BBFPS "was set up as a cover for operation 'Jungle.'" From 1949, MI 6 used a Kriegsmarine Fast Patrol Boat "under the command of the German naval officer Hans-Helmut Klose to transport agents" to landing sites in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland. "[A] permanent organisation ... was set up 1951 in Hamburg-Finkenwerder and later in Kiel." In 1952, a second Fast Patrol Boat was added and the mission "enlarged to include signal intelligence (SIGINT) equipment.... From 1951 onwards, MI 6 suspected that Soviet counter-intelligence might have infiltrated the spy networks in the forests of Courland. Actually,... [a]ll of the more than 42 agents which MI 6 had sent ... were caught, sentenced, or turned around as moles or counteragents. The Klose operations were successful as far as SIGINT and the naval aspects of his raids are concerned.... The MI 6 operations in the forests of Courland, however, were a complete failure.... In the end,... many human lives were sacrificed for a trickle of information, which after close analysis proved to be without much value."


Hess, Sigurd. "Intelligence Cooperation in Europe 1990 to the Present." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 1 (Summer 2003). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/ jih/previous.html]

From abstract: This article "addresses the many forms of [European] bilateral and multilateral intelligence cooperation.... The many obstacles to the development of a European intelligence policy as well as the factors driving the intelligence cooperation are discussed. Whether EU members have the political will and enough financial resources necessary to implement the momentous Helsinki declarations of December 1999 will also set the pace for an European intelligence policy."

[Liaison; OtherCountries/EU]

Hessen, Robert, ed. Berlin Alert: The Memoirs and Reports of Truman Smith. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984.

Smith was U.S. military attaché in Berlin from 1935 to 1939. See Truman Smith, Air Intelligence Activities: Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Berlin, Germany -- August 1935-April 1939 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Library Holdings, 1954-1956). See also Kenneth J. Campbell, "Truman Smith: American Military Attaché," Intelligencer 9, no. 3 (Oct. 1998): 16-17.

[Interwar/U.S.; MI/Attaches]

Heuer, Richards J.

Heuser, Beatrice. "Covert Action within British and American Concepts of Containment, 1948-51." In British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51, ed. Richard J. Aldrich, 65-84. London: Routledge, 1992.

[GenPostwar/40s; UK/Postwar/Gen]

Heuser, Beatrice. Western "Containment" Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-53. London: Routledge, 1989.

Aldrich, I&NS 5.3, says that this work gives careful attention to the West's "liberation" strategies with regard to Yugoslavia and Albania, and "sets these operations in the refreshing context of the wider patterns of Western policy.... [T]his study will constitute essential reading ... for those who wish to gain an understanding of the place of covert activities within high-level Western policies in Europe before 1954."


Hevia, James. The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Peake, Studies 57.3 (Sep 2013), and Intelligencer 20.2 (Fall-Winter 2013), finds that the author focuses on "the origins and evolution of British and Indian Army intelligence organizations in the so-called 'Great Game' era in South Asia. His objective is to convey how both contributed to shaping contemporary Asia and modern intelligence practices.... This book is thoroughly documented and will be of value to military historians, analysts, and contemporary critics alike."


Hewett, Jennifer. "The Miserable Death of the Spy Who Wasn't." Sydney Morning Herald, 19 Jun. 1999. [http://www.smh.com.au]

An Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) officer, Mervyn Jenkins, has hanged himself after coming "under investigation for a 'handling of documents incident' that happened several months ago." This comes in the wake of a tightening of security by the Australian service following the arrest of former DIO officer Jean-Philippe Wispeleare on spying charges in the United States.


Hewitt, Steve.

1. "'Information Believed True': RCMP Security Intelligence Activities on Canadian University Campuses and the Controversy Surrounding Them, 1961-1971." Canadian Historical Review 81, no. 2 (2000): 191-228.

2. "Intelligence at the Learneds: The RCMP, the Learneds, and the Canadian Historical Association." Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 8 (1998): 267-286.

3. "Reforming the Canadian Security State: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service and the 'Key Sectors' Program." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 165-184.

The "Key Sectors" program began in 1967. Its purpose, according to the author who has nothing good to say for the Security Service, "was to re-organize the security approach by focusing investigatory efforts on the extent of subversive infiltration of three main areas of Canadian society: the government...; the media...; and education."

4. Spying 101:  The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997. Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2002.

According to Peake, Studies 47.2 (2003), this work "is predominantly a study of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's involvement on Canadian university campuses for eight decades monitoring radicals and subversive activities inspired by communists and Quebec separatists." The author "finds it hard to accept that any serious subversion or espionage was going on, even in the United States."


Hewitt, Steve. "'Strangely Easy to Obtain': Canadian Passport Security, 1933-73." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 381-405.

The author examines "the history of abuses of Canadian passports and efforts by the Canadian government to curtain such activities." He sees the problem continuing "well into the future ... because of the nature of Canada itself."


Heymann, Hans. "Intelligence/Policy Relationships." In Intelligence: Policy and Process, eds. Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Turnstall, and James M. Keagle, 57-66. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985.


Heymann, Philip B. "Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Last Years of the Twentieth Century." National Security Law Report 18, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 1, 4-12.

Since the end of the Cold War, law enforcement and intelligence communities "find themselves working on the same issues in the same areas of the world." This is a significant change from the past, and creates several issues by "the blurring of boundaries between the intelligence community and law enforcement."


Heymann, Philip B. Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.

According to Rose, FA 78.2 (Mar.-Apr. 1999), "Heymann offers a range of intelligent, if unsurprising, suggestions for handling traditional terrorist threats ... [and] makes a persuasive case for avoiding overreaction."


Heymont, Irving. Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1960.

Pforzheimer finds "very few revealing conclusions or new ideas."



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