E.N.I. "CIA Wants Option of Recruiting Clergy." Christian Century, 11-18 Sep. 1996, 844.
Report on comments by Rodney Page of the National Council of Churches and DCI John Deutch's response at 17 July 1996 SSCI session. Page argued for an absolute ban on the use of clergy by the CIA.
Ennes, James M., Jr. Assault on the "Liberty": The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship. New York: Random House, 1979.
According to Petersen, "Ennes, an officer aboard the Liberty at the time, questions the official explanation attributing the incident to a mistake and ascribes to the Israelis the motive of preventing the ship from monitoring the course of the war." Constantinides notes that Ennes "has nothing solid on the motive of the Israeli attack" and, therefore, "can only offer his own hypothesis."
Ennes, James M., Jr. "Israeli Attack on U.S. Ship Reveals Failure of C3." Defense Electronics, Oct. 1981, 60-62 ff. [Petersen]
Ennes, James M., Jr. "Israel's Attack on the USS Liberty : Cracks in the 25-Year Cover-Up." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Jun. 1992, 52-53.
Ennes, James M. "National Security Agency Documents on Attack on USS Liberty Prove What?" Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Sep. 2003, 25.
"Instead of releasing transcripts of the attack itself,... the National Security Agency (NSA) [has] released signals intelligence transcripts collected after the attack -- radio messages from helicopter pilots who came out afterward to clean up. What a disappointment. We had hoped for some of the communications we know took place between the Israeli jet pilots and their headquarters, but those were not released."
Ennis, Jerry D.
1. "Anatoli Golitsyn: Long-time CIA Agent?" Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 26-45.
The answer to the author's question is, "no." It appears that James Angleton's suggestion otherwise was typically Angleton muddying the waters.
2. "What Did Angleton Say About Golitsyn?" Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 6 (Dec. 2007): 905-909.
The author revisits the conclusions in his earlier article about what Angleton said about Golitsin and why he said it. He argues that Angleton's point was that Golitsin had decided to defect long before he did, and had been gathering information to pass along when he did defect.
Ennis, Michael E. [BGEN/USMC]
1. "The Future of Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 16, no. 4 (Oct. 2000): 1-2.
The Intelligence Community "should focus more of its effort on ... 'operationalizing' intelligence -- that is, making it more usable, understandable, and accessible to its consumers, the operators and planners.... [T]he first step in operationalizing intelligence needs to be a physical integration of intelligence personnel within critical warfighting functions.... The second step ... is to build intelligence products with the end user (the operator/planner) in mind.... The last step ... is for the commanders to take a more active role in intelligence."
2. "The Future of Intelligence." Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1999, 46-47.
An earlier version of the above.
[GenPostCW/90s/Gen; GenPostCW/00s/Gen; MI/Marines]
Ensign, Eric S. [LT/USN] Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea, 1920-1933. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2001.
Hanyok, I&NS 17.2, notes that Ensign covers "many interesting aspects of the Coast Guard's intelligence effort" in this "well-written history." However, "[d]espite the details, he does not organize them into a coherent whole.... [T]he book never effectively demonstrates how intelligence actually affected the overall efforts to control maritime liquor smuggling." For Anderson, Intelligencer 13.1, this "interesting little study" should have avoided the "use of some current military bureaucratic jargon" such as "force multiplier" and "dominant battlespace knowledge."
To Heitmann, JIH 2.2, the Coast Guard "waged an unrelenting campaign to detect, monitor, apprehend, and support the prosecution of those who smuggled alcohol on the high seas and navigable waterways of the United States." Iintelligence was used "to bridge the capabilities gap between well-organized smugglers and under-resourced law enforcement.... [Ensign's] study ... brings to light the massive, all-source intelligence effort that provided the backbone of Coast Guard operations in the 'Rum War at Sea.'"
Ensor, David. "Biggest U.S. Spy Agency Choking on Too Much Information." CNN, 25 Nov. 1999. [http://www.cnn.com]
The National Security Agency "is in crisis, overwhelmed by too many targets, too much information and the challenges created by increasingly sophisticated technologies."
Ensor, David, Jonathan Karl, and Steve Turnham. "CIA Under Fire in Iraqi Intelligence Flap." CNN, 11 Jul. 2003. [http://www.cnn.com]
In a written statement on 11 July 2003, SSCI Chairman Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) criticized the CIA's "'extremely sloppy handling' of some prewar intelligence on Iraq and accused the agency of leaking information that reflected badly on President Bush."
Entous, Adam, and Julian E. Barnes. "U.S. Intelligence-Sharing Leaves Ukraine in the Dark." Wall Street Journal, 27 Feb. 2015. [http://www.wsj.com]
The United States "is providing spy-satellite imagery to Ukraine to help in its fight against Russia-backed rebels, but with a catch: the images are significantly degraded to avoid provoking Russia or compromising U.S. secrets. The White House agreed last year to Ukraine's request to provide the photos and other intelligence. But before delivering them, US officials black out military staging areas on Russian territory and reduce the resolution so that enemy formations can't be clearly made out, making them less useful to Ukrainian military commanders."
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