Drad - Dre


Dragonette, Charles N. "The Birth of COMINT." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 16.

Draitser, Emil.

1. "Hunting for Interwar European Diplomacy Secrets: Tradecraft of Dmitry Bystrolyotov." Journal of Intelligence History 6, no. 2 (Winter 2006-2007). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]

From abstract: This article concentrates on "a member of the 'Flying squad,' a mobile group of Soviet undercover operatives in interwar Europe," in connection with "one of [Bystrolyotov's] most successful operation[s] -- his recruitment of a retired Swiss Army officer and adventurist[,] Rossi de Ry."

2. Stalin's Romeo Spy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010.

For Ehrman, Studies, 54.4 (Dec. 2010), this biography of the great Soviet spy Dmitri Bystrolyotov "is interesting, even fascinating in places, but of uncertain reliability." Although flawed, "it is captivating and ...worthwhile." The author was born in the USSR, met and interviewed Bystrolyotov as an old man, and "was given access to his papers." Draitser immigrated to the United States in 1974, and earned a PhD from UCLA. He is clearly "a conscientious scholar and researcher. For this book, he seems to have mined the available sources -- including declassified KGB files -- thoroughly." But, as he acknowledges, "the Russian files are incomplete, and he often has to rely on either his interviews with Bystrolyotov or the retired spy's memoirs to tell his story. As an example of historical and intelligence scholarship, therefore, Stalin's Romeo Spy needs to be read with a careful, critical eye."


Drake, Jessica. "NRO Worries that Techniques in Yugoslavia May Have Been Exposed." Aerospace Daily, 9 Jul. 1999.

NRO Director Keith Hall said on 8 July 1999 that the NRO "debuted several important capabilities during the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia, but is concerned that some of its techniques may have been exposed to potential adversaries."

[GenPost/CW/99/Yugo: MI/Ops/90s/Kosovo; NRO/90s/99]

Drake, Richard. "The Italian Parliamentary Reports on the Mitrokhin Archive." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20,no. 2 (Summer 2007): 344-356.

"By viewing the Red Brigades as a Soviet device, rather than as the product of Italy's historic revolutionary culture..., the majority commissioners [of the Italian Parliamentary Commission] produced a report that lacked an effective connection with the political and ideological culture primarily responsible for Italian terrorism."


Draper, Theodore. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affair. New York: Hill and Wang, 1991.

In Lowenthal's view, Draper "does not achieve his goal of complete objectivity, but this is a very useful account of the complex series of operations." Luxenberg, WPNWE, 17-23 Jun. 1991, says that the book contains "nothing much that is new or startling about either the Iran arms sale or the Reagan administration's secret resupply of the contras in defiance of Congress." Nevertheless, Draper "has written a readable and detailed narrative that ... may be the standard reference for anyone who does not wish to go to the source documents."


Draper, Theodore. "Is the CIA Necessary?" New York Review of Books, 14 Aug. 1997, 5.


Dravis, Michael W. "Storming Fortress Albania: American Covert Operations in Microcosm, 1949-54." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 4 (Jan. 1992): 425-442.

This article breaks no new ground on the Albanian operation, and the author's strong distaste for covert action leads him astray analytically when he goes beyond the bounds of that effort. Nonetheless, the more focused presentation is a decent brief retelling of the main thrust of the Albanian operation. The author sees the action as of British origin, with the Americans being brought in "for financial and operational reasons." But "bitter wrangling between the British and Americans ... seriously compromised the effectiveness of the program." Of course, the operation was seriously compromised by Kim Philby's presence as the SIS liaison in Washington. In the end, "the Albanian project did not meet either of the criteria by which covert actions are judged successful: policy objectives were not achieved, and American complicity was publicly exposed."

[CIA/40s; CA/Eur][c]

Drea, Edward J.

Drechsler, Donald R. "Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq." Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 3-30.

From abstract: "Cultural, structural and bureaucratic barriers between the Department of State and the Department of Defense prevented effective integration, particularly in the postwar planning phase of Operation 'Iraqi Freedom'. In contrast, the postwar planning in Kosovo, under the PDD 56 interagency coordination process, could have served as a useful template for the political-military planning process.... Iraq demonstrated that partial State-Defense integration ... was insufficient for an undertaking of this magnitude."

[MI/Ops/00s/Iraq/05; OtherAgencies/State/Gen]

Dreisziger, N.F., ed. Mobilization for Total War. Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo, 1981.


Drell, Bernard. "Intelligence Research -- Some Suggested Approaches." Studies in Intelligence 1, no. 4 (Fall 1957): 79-95.

The object of "intelligence research is not encyclopedic information; it must be limited to information that answers questions of intelligence interest.... [N]o one method is appropriate to all kinds of intelligence research. Techniques and methods must be adapted to the problem, its scope, its urgency, and to the nature of the evidence."


Drendel, Lou. SR-71 Blackbird in Action. Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1982. [Robarge]


Dreux, William B. No Bridges Blown. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971.

http://www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger: This is the "[s]tory of an OSS Jedburgh operative in France in WWII" and is "one of the few books ever written about the Jeds by a Jed."


Drew, Christopher. "U-2 Spy Plane Evades the Day of Retirement." New York Times, 21 Mar. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Because of updates in ... its powerful sensors, [the U-2] has become the most sought-after spy craft in ... Afghanistan. As it shifts from hunting for nuclear missiles to detecting roadside bombs, it is outshining even the unmanned drones in gathering a rich array of intelligence used to fight the Taliban.... [Today] the U-2 and its pilots ... are in direct radio contact with the troops in Afghanistan. And instead of following a rote path, they are now shifted frequently in midflight to scout roads for convoys and aid soldiers in firefights....

"In the weeks leading up to the recent offensive in Marja, military officials said, several of the 32 remaining U-2s found nearly 150 possible mines in roads and helicopter landing areas, enabling the Marines to blow them up before approaching the town. Marine officers say they relied on photographs from the U-2's old film cameras, which take panoramic images at such a high resolution they can see insurgent footpaths, while the U-2's newer digital cameras beamed back frequent updates on 25 spots where the Marines thought they could be vulnerable. In addition, the U-2's altitude, once a defense against antiaircraft missiles, enables it to scoop up signals from insurgent phone conversations that mountains would otherwise block....

"[T]he U-2's replacement sits right across the base -- the Global Hawk, a remote-controlled drone that flies almost as high as the U-2 and typically stays aloft for 24 hours or more. The first few Global Hawks have been taking intelligence photos in Iraq and Afghanistan. But a larger model that could also intercept communications has been delayed, and the Air Force is studying how to add sensors that can detect roadside bombs to other planes. So officials say it will most likely be 2013 at the earliest before the U-2 is phased into retirement."


Drew, Jonathan. "U.S. Marine Corps Renames Its Elite Branch 'Raiders.'" Time, 19 Jun. 2015. [http://time.com]

"The Marines will rename several special operations units as Marine Raiders at a ceremony" on 19 June 2015. "The name will give a unique identity to the Marines' branch of U.S. Special Operations Command.... [T]he formal names of eight units comprising some 2,700 Marines will include 'Marine Raider.'"

[MI/Marines/10; MI/SpecOps/10s/15]



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