Dec - Dee


Decker, Malcolm. Benedict Arnold: Son of the Havens. New York: Antiquarian, 1961.


Decker, Michael, and Christopher B. Batts [CAPT/USMC]. "Marine Corps Counterintelligence Support to the Warfighter: Past, Present, and Future." American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 21-26.

"[E]ven with advances in technolgy, the core competencies of Marine Corps CI will continue to be intelligence collectiom focused on espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism."

[MI/CI & Marines]

Decker, Peter B. [CDR/USN (Ret.)] Part 1 of 2. "A Naval Victory & Intelligence Failure." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2003): 17-18. Part 2 of 2. Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 25.

On Battle of Shiloh.


DeConcini, Dennis. "Congressional Perspective: Alternative Grand Strategies and Intelligence Implications." Comparative Strategy 14, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 425-429.


[DeConcini, Dennis [Sen. (D-AZ)].] "April Breakfast Remarks: DeConcini Responds to Gates Remarks on Oversight." National Security Law Report 15, no. 5 (May 1993): 1-5. [Text]


DeConcini, Dennis. "The Role of U.S. Intelligence in Promoting Economic Interests." Journal of International Affairs 48 (1994): 39-57.


DeConde, Alexander, ed. Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas. 3 vols. New York: Scribner's, 1978.

See Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., "Intelligence and Counterintelligence," vol. 1, 417- 427.


De Cornoy, Jacques. "Laos: The Forgotten War." Bulletin of the Concerned Asian Scholars 2 (Apr.-Jul. 1970): 21-23. [Petersen]


DeCoster, Bryan Donald. "OSS Estimate of German Logistics on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: An Early Example of Strategic Warning." Defense Intelligence Journal 3, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 107-131.

Although this article concludes that analysts of the Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch of the Office of the Coordinator of Information "accurately estimated the supply capabilities and requirements of the German Army and the resulting impact on future operation," it does not really show that the R&A successes amounted to strategic warning. The author admits that "their presentation did not emphasize their value for strategic warning. Thus it is hard to discern their value."


de Croÿ, Princess Marie. War Memories. London: Macmillan, 1932.

[WWI/Other/Belgium; Women/WWI/Belgium]

Dedijer, Stevan. "British Intelligence: The Rainbow Enigma." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 2 (1986): 73-90.

This article concerns the so-called Rainbow portrait of Queen Elizabeth I.


Dedijer, Stevan. "Ragusa Intelligence and Security (1301-1806): A Model for the Twenty-First Century?." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 101-114.

"In order to adapt to its hostile world," the Ragusa Republic (modern-day Dubrovnik) "had to develop an unparalleled I&S [intelligence and security] system." The city-state "lived free for five centuries, using the well-organized intelligence and security connections of its ruling elite."


Dedijer, Stevan. "Watching the Watchmen: Parliaments and National Intelligence Services." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 34, no. 5 (Jun. 1978): 40-43.


Dedijer, Stevan, and Nicolas Jequier, eds. Intelligence for Economic Development: An Inquiry into the Role of the Knowledge Industry. Oxford: Berg, 1987. New York: St. Martin's, 1987.


Deery, Phillip. "Covert Propaganda and the Cold War: Britain and Australia, 1948-1955." The Round Table 361 (2001): 607-621.

[Australia/Gen; UK/Postwar/Gen]

Deery, Phillip. "A Double Agent Down Under: Australian Security and the Infiltration of the Left." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 3 (Jun. 2007): 346-366.

The focus here is on the work of Maximilian Wechsler as a penetration agent for ASIO from 1972 to 1975. His target groups were the Communist Party of Australia and the Socialist Workers' League.


Deery, Phillip. "Menzies, Macmillan and the 'Woomera Spy Case' of 1958." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 23-38.

"The Woomera episode ... highlighted the readiness of Australia and Britain to collude so that American nerves, if aroused, could be calmed."

[Australia/Gen; UK/Postwar/Gen]

Deery, Phillip. "Science, Security and the Cold War: An Australian Dimension." War & Society 17, no. 1 (1999): 81-99.


Dees, Jennifer L. "Joint STARS in Kosovo: Can the Army and the Air Force Blend Their Operational Differences?" Military Intelligence, 25, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1999): 16-18.

Differing views of JSTARS by the Army and Air Force caused some conflict in Kosovo in theater collection strategy.


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