D - Dak


Dabelko, David D., and Geoffrey D. Dabelko. "The International Environment and the U.S. Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-41.

The intelligence community can "enhance national security by first recognizing the connections between the environment and ... security, and second, by redefining its mission in terms of these environmental threats.... With this altered focus, the intelligence community will augment existing environmental data with a great deal of indispensable information that relates directly to environmental phenomena.... In this manner, cooperation between the intelligence community and the environmental community will enhance security for the United States and the world."


Dabelko, Geoffrey D.

1. "Security Perils in the 1990s." The Georgetown Compass 2 (Winter 1991): 50-53.

2. And David D. Dabelko. "Environmental Security: Issues of Conflict and Redefinition." Environmental Change and Security Report 1 (Spring 1995): 3-13.


Dabelko, Geoffrey D., ed. "The U.S. National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2015: Excerpts, Commentaries, and Response." Environmental Change & Security Project Report 7 (Summer 2001): 59-99.

There are 14 brief responses to the NIC's report included here, as well as a response by Ellen Laipson, acting chair of the NIC. See National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts (Washington, DC: NIC, 2001). [http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2015.html]


Dabney, Virginius. "Jack Jouett's Ride." American Heritage 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1961): 56-59.

Calder: Discusses Jouett's exploits "during and after the American Revolution."


Dabringhaus, Erhard. Klaus Barbie: The Shocking Story of How the U.S. Used This Nazi War Criminal as an Intelligence Agent. Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1984.

According to Ruffner, "CIC Records...," CSI Bulletin 11 (Summer 2000), "[t]he news of [former German SS officer Klaus] Barbie's arrest [in Bolivia in 1983] and his image on American television led to his recognition by one of his former CIC handlers.... Dabringhaus contacted NBC News and reported that he had worked with Barbie while serving as a CIC officer in Germany in 1948." In this book, he is "recall[ing] his CIC role years afterwards, colored by the knowledge that his actions had affected history for better or worse."


Daggett, Stephen. The U.S. Intelligence Budget: A Basic Overview. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 24 Sep. 2004. [http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21945.pdf]

This report "describes the intelligence budget and gives rough estimates of the amounts for major components of the budget based on unclassified sources. It also reviews current procedures for formulating and executing the budget. And it highlights how proposed legislation addresses the issue."


Dahl, Erik J. Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013,

Brooks, Proceedings 139.12 (Dec. 2013), finds that much of this work examines "cases of terrorist-related warning failures as well as 227 cases where terrorist attcks were successfully twarted.... [N]o other scholarly work has attempted this sort of comparison of why warning worked in some cases and did not in others." This is "a well-written and thought-provoking book that provides well-researched analysis of what makes warning intelligence work."

[Analysis/Surprise; Terrorism/10s/Gen]

Dahl, Erik J. "Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance." Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 6 (Dec. 2010): 778-799.

The author "argues that in order for an intelligence failure such as a major terrorist attack to inspire improved intelligence performance -- to be a true wake-up call -- that failure must not only act as a focusing event to bring more attention to the threat, but it must also lead to more intelligence collection and greater reeceptivity toward intelligence on the part of decision-makers."


Dahl, Erik J. "Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence against Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (Feb. 2005): 31-55.

From abstract: This article seeks "to integrate the earlier literature on intelligence failure with the newer threat of terrorist attack..., by examining the bombing of the US Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983." The author "concludes that most studies of the Beirut bombing are mistaken in their assessment of the role played by intelligence in that disaster, and suggests that our understanding of intelligence failure against surprise attacks needs to be revised in the age of terrorism."

[Analysis/Surprise; Terrorism/00s/Gen]

Dahl, Per F. Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear Energy. Bristol, UK: Institute of Physics Publishers, 1999.

Beard, I&NS 16.3, notes that this work tells two stories: one, the scientific race for the bomb; and the other, the commando and air attacks on the Norwegian plants making heavy water. The reviewer gives Dahl "high marks," since "[b]oth scientific and military events are expertly described."


Dahlburg, John-Thor, and Bob Drogin. "Europe Angered by Claims of U.S. Spying." Los Angeles Times, 24 Feb. 2000. [http://www.latimes.com]

"Just whom the NSA listens to -- and why -- is increasingly a matter of international dispute.... 'How the United States Spies on You' was the alarming headline [on 23 February 2000] in the French newspaper Le Monde. The same day, a committee of the 15-nation European Parliament heard a British physicist and journalist, Duncan Campbell, claim that Echelon was used to help Boeing Co. and Raytheon Co. beat out European competitors in foreign markets."


Daigler, Kenneth A.

Dailey, Brian D., and Patrick J. Parker, eds. Soviet Strategic Deception. Lexington, MA: Heath/Hoover Institution, 1987.

According to Petersen, this work contains "dozens of articles on various aspects of Soviet deception, many of them well-documented." Glantz, I&NS 3.1, sees this work as "valuable ... because of its sophistication and comprehensive approach to the subject.... Contributors..., who span both the official intelligence community and the heights of academia, address strategic deception from a host of perspectives to form an imposing mosaic of deception capabilities."


Dailey, Dell L. [LTGEN/USA], and Jeffrey G. Webb [LTCOL/USMC]. "U.S. Special Operations Command and the War on Terror." Joint Force Quarterly 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 44-47. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/issue40.htm]

"U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is structuring and posturing to lead Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in the war on terror.... [T]he command has been designated as the supported [emphasis added] combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and, when directed, executing campaigns against terrorist organizations."


Daily Mail (London). "After 65 Years in the Shadows, the Indian Heroine of Churchill's Elite SOE Spy Network Is to Be Recognised with a Statue in London." 4 Jan. 2011. [http://www.dailymail.co.uk]

Noor Inayat Khan was the "first female radio operator sent into Nazi-occupied France." Working for SOE's F (France) Section, she was the radio operator (codename "Madeleine") for the "Prosper" resistance network in Paris, until "she was betrayed and captured." She was "executed at Dachau concentration camp on September 13, 1944, aged just 30.... [H]er bravery is ... to be permanently recognised in England with a bronze bust in central London, close to the Bloomsbury house where she lived as a child." See Basu, Spy Princess (2006); and Fuller, Born for Sacrifice (1957).

[UK/WWII/Services/SOE; Women/WWII/UK; WWII/Eur/Fr]

Dainville, A. de. "Une Resistance Militaire 1940-1944: La Naissance de L'O.R.A. Ses Problems et son Activite en 1944." Revue Historique des Armees 3 (1974): 11-36. [Calder]


Dakin, Douglas. The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913. Salonika, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966.

Constantinides: "Dakin gives particulars on the intelligence, assassination, and support networks set up by the Greek side to fight the Bulgarians and the Comitadjis for control of Macedonia.... The excellent Greek system for penetrating and bribing Turkish governmental and police authorities is pictured as part of the unified, well-planned effort."

[Historical/PreWWI; OtherCountries/Greece]


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