Cowan, Ian B. "Security Implications of Global Climate Changes." Canadian Defence Quarterly 19 (Autumn 1989): 43-49.
Cowan, William V. "Melting the Snowman: Communications and the Counternarcotic Threat." Signal 44, no. 4 (1989): 27-32. [Petersen]
Cowburn, Benjamin. No Cloak, No Dagger. London: Adventurers Club, 1955. No Cloak, No Dagger: Allied Spycraft in Occupied France. Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2009.
From publisher: "The memoir of SOE agent Benjamin Cowburn is rightly regarded as a classic of wartime literature.... Cowburn explains the methods of special agents who were dropped into France during the war and the ways that agents would set about establishing secure networks with the French Resistance."
Cowden, Robert. "OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War II." Studies in Intelligence 58, no. 2 (Jun. 2914): 35-45.
Though brief in duration, the double-agent operations of OSS's counterintelligence division (X-2) "provided significant counterintelligence value by enabling the Allies to understand and ultimately control Abwehr espionage activities in France after the invasion. Secondarily, the double agents also offered tactical contributions to several deception oprations."
Cowell, Alan. "Blair Did Not Knowingly Use False Report, Inquiry Is Told." New York Times, 12 Aug. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 11 August 2003, "[s]enior government officials told a high-profile inquiry ... that intelligence officers had registered their concern at the way Prime Minister Tony Blair's government presented the threat from Iraq's weapons systems before going to war. But the officials ... denied that the government knowingly used false information to create a sense of imminent threat from Iraq."
Cowell, Alan (New York Times).
Cowles, Virginia. The Phantom Major: The Story of David Stirling and the SAS Regiment. London: Collins, 1958. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2011. [pb] The Phantom Major: The Story of David Stirling and His Desert Command. New York: Haper, 1958.
From publisher: "In the dark and uncertain days of 1941 and 1942, when Rommel's Afrika Korps was sweeping towards Egypt and the Suez Canal, a small group of daring raiders made history for the Allies.... The men were the ... SAS, the brainchild of David Stirling.... Virginia Cowles's ... narrative, based on the eyewitness testimony of the men who took part, gives a fascinating insight into the early years of the SAS."
Cowley, Chris. Guns, Lies and Spies: How We Armed Iraq. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992.
Miller, I&NS 9.3: Cowley was "project manager for the 'Supergun.'" He displays a "tendency ... to leap readily to conclusions where the evidence is, to say the least, sparse."
Cowley, Malcolm. "The Sorrows of Elmer Davis." New Republic, 3 May 1943, 591-593. [Winkler]
Cowley, Robert, ed. The Cold War: A Military History. New York: Random House, 2005.
Wilson, Proceedings 132.3 (Mar. 2006), sees this as a "first-rate collection of essays.... [S]ome of the finest writers and historians... discuss the relevance of ... important episodes and conflicts" during the Cold War.
Cox, Arthur M. "CIA and the Intelligence Community." In The Myths of National Security: The Perils of Secret Government, 87-118. Boston: Beacon, 1975,.
Petersen: "Critical assessment."
Cox, Douglas. "Burn After Viewing: The CIA's Destruction of the Abu Zubaydah Tapes and the Law of Federal Records." Journal of National Security Law & Policy 5, no. 1 (2011). [http://www.jnslp.com]
The author argues that "the CIA should have treated the tapes as records and, had it done so, the much publicized debates within the CIA and the White House over whether it was politically palatable to destroy them and questions about their relevance to ongoing cases and government inquiries would have been largely academic. The federal records laws, properly applied, would have required the preservation of the tapes."
Cox, Isaac Joslin. The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1818: A Study in American Diplomacy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1918.
This work provides a detailed and well-documented study of the intrigues surrounding the U.S. acquisition of West Florida in 1810.
Cox, Joseph L. [MAJ/USA] Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom -- What Went Wrong? Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, May 2006. [http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/cox.pdf]
Aftergood, Secrecy News, 4 Aug. 2006, notes that information operations "can include military deception, psychological operations, operations security, and electronic warfare." This "monograph investigates the role of information operations in Iraq and presents recommendations for changes in doctrine, training, resources and intelligence support."
Cox, Sebastian. "A Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain, 1940." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 425-443.
Sexton points to this article as a "rare study of the problem of inaccurate or exaggerated enemy loss claims."
Cox, Sebastian. "'The Difference between Black and White': Churchill, Imperial Politics, and Intelligence before the 1941 Crusader Offensive." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 3 (Jul. 1994): 405-447.
The author argues that Churchill orchestrated a "cooked" -- although in the end not inaccurate -- report on the relationship between German and allied air forces in the Middle East prior to the Crusader offensive. The reason for doing so was Commonwealth politics or, more specifically, concerns expressed by the Australian and New Zealand governments about a potential lack of allied air superiority in the theater, as had been the case in Greece and Crete.
Cox, Sebastian. "The Sources and Organisation of RAF Intelligence and Its Influence on Operations." In The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War, ed. Horst Boog, 553-579. Oxford: Berg, 1992.
Coyle, Gene A. "John Franklin Carter: Journalist, FDR's Secret Investigator, Soviet Agent?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 148-172.
The author looks at the indirect accusation by Pavel Sudoplatov that Carter had been a GRU agent during the war. In the end, Coyle can only reach the conclusion that "a fair assessment is that the allegation is plausible."
Coyle, Gene A., and Alexander Wilson. "Haversack Ruses -- From Leather to Digital." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 27, no.1 (Spring 2014): 156-177.
Meinertzhagen (1917), Dudley Clarke, the "False Going" Map (1942), Peter Fleming/Burma (1942), Operation Mincemeat,Post WWII and digital (not much of the latter).
Coyne, Kevin M. [LTCOL/USAF] "Developing US European Command's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Strategy for Fiscal Years 2010 through 2015." Air and Space Power Journal 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 81-90. [http://www.airpower.au.af.mil]
"Since most ISR assets continue to support USCENTCOM, other theaters competing for remaining scarce ISR resources (such as USEUCOM) should develop requirements-based strategies to better integrate current and planned allied capabilities and thereby offset their collection shortfalls."
Coyle, Robert E. "Surveillance from the Seas." Military Law Review 60 (Spring 2011): 75-97. [Petersen]
CQWR [Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report]
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