Copeland, B. Jack.
1. "Colossus : Its Origins and Originators." IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 26, no. 4 (2004): 38-45.
2. "Colossus and the Dawning of the Computer Age." In Action This Day: Bletchley Park from the Breaking of the Enigma Code to the Birth of the Modern Computer, eds. Ralph Erskine and Michael Smith, 342-369, 499-505. London and New York: Bantam, 2001.
3. "Tunny and Colossus: Breaking the Lorenz Schlusselzusatz Traffic." In The History of Information Security: A Comprehensive Handbook, eds. Karl de Leeuw and J.A. Bergstra, 447-478. Amsterdam and London: Elsevier, 2007.
Copeland, B. Jack, et al. Colossus: The Secret of Bletchley Park's Codebreaking Computers. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Erskine, Times Higher Educational Supplement, 6 Oct. 2006, notes that Colossus was the special-purpose electronic computer used by Bletchley Park code-breakers to solve messages enciphered on the German Lorenz SZ 40/42 teleprinter cipher machine, which was code-named Tunny. Colossus entered service in February 1944, but Bletchley had attacked Tunny manually from 1941 onwards. A substantial part of this book explains how Tunny messages were broken . Colossus includes contributions by the machine's designers and the cryptanalysts and operators who used it, as well as intelligence historians." This book "is inevitably quite complex at times , but with application, non-mathematicians should be able to follow most of it"; it "will appeal to anyone interested in Colossus, code-breaking or Blechley Park. Copeland and the other contributors have rightly done the Tunny code-breakers proud." This review is worth reading beyond its review purpose for the observations on Tunny that Erskine has included.
For Kruh, Cryptologia 30.4 (Oct. 2006), the authors "draw on a wide variety of sources to paint a complete picture of Colossus and its wider importance." The work mixes essays with personal accounts; it "is an outstanding, enjoyable book." Cohu, Telegraph (London), 12 Mar. 2006, comments that "Copeland ... gets around the paucity of detail about Colossus by marshalling a multilayered, broad picture of Bletchley's work and personalities, using contributions from eye-witnesses" and academics, such as Simon Singh, Stephen Budiansky and Michael Smith.
Comparing Copeland's treatment of Colossus to Gannon's, Ferry, The Guardian, 29 Jul. 2006, comments that Copeland's work "has the great advantage (if you are prepared to forgive some repetition) that he has gathered first-person accounts from many of the protagonists, which provide a wealth of incidental colour."
Burke, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), was less pleased by this volume than many other reviewers. He notes that "[o]nly a handful of the articles are based on any new research"; and "only two" of the volume's "major articles appear to be new," with most being "versions of previously published works." He also criticizes Colossus because the articles "are not integrated, they do not share a uniform volcabulary or format, they are directed toward varied audiences, and they are not in full agreement about facts and interpretations."
Copeland, B. Jack, ed. Alan Turing's Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker's Struggle to Build the Modern Computer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Copeland, B. Jack, ed. The Essential Turing: Seminal Writings in Computing, Logic, Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, and Artificial Life plus The Secrets of Enigma. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
According to Kruh, Cryptologia 29.2 (Apr. 2005), the editor of this work, who is Director of the Turing Archive for the History of Computing, introduces Turing's "key writings on a variety of subjects" and puts them into context. Selby, I&NS 21.2 (Apr. 2006), comments that the editor writes his "historical and explanatory notes ... in a clear factual style.... The reader who is not mathematically inclined would probably not find much comfort" in chapters 1-4 or 15-17. However, chapters 5-14 are "considerably more accessible."
Copeland, Miles. Beyond Cloak or Dagger: Inside the CIA. New York: Pinnacle, 1975.
Copeland, Miles. "The Functioning of Strategic Intelligence." Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest 2, 3, and 4 (1977): 29-32, 36-38, and 32-35. [Petersen]
Copeland, Miles. The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970
Clark comment: Copeland's account of the CIA's involvement in the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s needs to be compared with that of Eveland in Ropes of Sand.
Peterson calls this work the "[o]bservations of a former CIA Middle East specialist on events of 1950s and 1960s." Sounding a cautionary note, Constantinides points to a "consensus of those familiar with events" that, as perceptive as some of Copeland's comments may be, his "versions of behind-the-scenes events about which he learned later, and even those in which he said he was a participant, cannot be accepted automatically as reliable and accurate."
See Barrett J. Riordan, "The Plowshare Program and Copeland's Suez Energy Deception," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 124-143.
Copeland, Miles. The Game Player: Confessions of the CIA's Original Political Operative. London: Aurum, 1989.
Copeland, Miles. "Unmentionable Uses of the CIA: Counterterrorist Activity." National Review 25 (14 Sep. 1973): 990-997.
Copeland, Miles. Without Cloak or Dagger: The Truth about the New Espionage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974. The Real Spy World. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974. London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1978.
According to Petersen, Copeland's views on CIA operations are "held unreliable by some experts." Similarly, Constantinides suggests that readers would be "well advised not to consider the work a reliable reference about the 'new espionage' or many other matters it touches upon." Chambers sees the book as "entertaining, but not necessarily the best introduction" to intelligence activities.
Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence (1990), p. 9, takes a different view. He sees Without Cloak or Dagger as "one of the few works of nonfiction to concentrate upon the techniques of spying.... Though Copeland's book received unfavorable reviews for hyperbole and allegedly inaccurate details about specific operations, he himself is a former clandestine operator, knowledgeable in tradecraft, and he conveys the sense of espionage as an art, stressing the human factor."
[CIA/Overviews & Tradecraft][c]
Copeland, Thomas E., ed. The Information Revolution and National Security. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2000.
Proceedings from a conference co-sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute and the University of Pittsburgh Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security.
Copley, Gregory R. "Forging the Shield: Intelligence Management in the Developing World." Defense and Foreign Affairs 15 (Dec. 1987): 14-21.
Copley, Gregory. "Strategic Prices of the U.S. Iranian Raid." Defense and Foreign Affairs 8, no. 5 (1980): 48.
Copp, Dewitt. Famous Soviet Spies: The Kremlin's Secret Weapon. Washington, DC: US News and World Report, 1973. [Petersen]
Corbin, Jane. The Base: Al-Qaeda and the Changing Face of Global Terror. London: Pocket Books, 2003.
From publisher: "Tracing al-Qaeda's roots back to the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan," the author "picks up the complicated trail that led to the collapse of the Twin Towers and beyond." Corbin "examines the West's response to the threat of al-Qaeda and declares it a failure."
Corddry, Charles. "Piggy-Back Satellites Hailed As Big Space Gain for U.S." Washington Post, 23 Jun. 1960. [Bamford2]
Cordesman, Anthony H.
Cordovez, Diego, and Selig S. Harrison. Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Warren, Surveillant 4.4/5, identifies the authors as a UN diplomat (Cordovez) and a Washington Post reporter (Harrison). In this telling, DCI Bill Casey is portrayed as the "driving force" for a greater U.S. role in the war. Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-TX) "also gets credit for pushing the war." Although the authors give "too much credit to the good intentions of the Soviet Union and its latter day leaders,... [the book] has the ring of truth as a history of the war and the withdrawal." To McGehee, CIABASE Update Report, Aug. 1997, the book "gives an unusually well-documented account of this CIA covert operation and its wide-ranging and long-lasting consequences."
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