Chapman, Bert. Researching National Security and Intelligence Policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004.
Howard, Air & Space Power Journal 19.3 (Fall 2005), says that this work "is a veritable cornucopia of sources and ratings of their effectiveness. What may prove even more useful is the extent of each chapter's documentation. These endnotes, which attest to the author's thoroughness, include Web sites and e-mail addresses where appropriate. The book's user-friendliness also helps a great deal."
Chapman, Betty, and Ronald L. Bonewitz. Mrs Zigzag: The Extraordinary Life of a Secret Agent's Wife. Stroud, UK: History Press, 2013.
Peake, Studies 58.2 (Jun. 2014), notes that since Mrs. Chapman cooperated with Nicholas Booth in writing Zigzag (2007), "there is little new in Mrs Zigzag." Nevertheless, this "is the only book to describe life with a WW II double agent. It is by no means typical, and it fills a gap."
Chapman, Freddie Spencer. The Jungle Is Neutral. London: Chatto & Windus, 1949. London: Corgi, 1973. [pb] New York: TimeLife Education; 1988. Guildford, CT: Lyons Press, 2003.
From the Back Cover: "After the fall of Malaysia to the Japanese, the unflappable ... Chapman survived for years in the jungle as a guerilla fighter. The Jungle is Neutral is his amazing tale of survival and valor against all odds." See also, Moynahan, Jungle Soldier (2009).
Chapman, Guy. The Dreyfus Case. New York: Reynal, 1955.
Chapman, John W. M. "Britain, Japan and the 'Higher Realms of Intelligence,' 1900-1918." In The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000. Vol. 3 : The Military Dimension, eds. Ian T.M. Gow, Yoichi Hirama, and John W. M. Chapman, 71-88. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Chapman, John W. M. "Britain, Japan and the 'Higher Realms of Intelligence,' 1918-1945." In The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000. Vol. 3 : The Military Dimension, eds. Ian T.M. Gow, Yoichi Hirama, and John W. M. Chapman, 151-173. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Chapman, John W. M. "British Use of 'Dirty Tricks' in External Policy Prior to 1914." War in History 9, no. 1 (2002): 60-81.
Chapman, John W.M. "No Final Solution: A Survey of the Cryptologic Capabilities of German Military Agencies, 1926-1935." Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 1 (Jan. 1986): 13-47.
Chapman, John W.M. "Pearl Harbor: The Anglo-Australian Dimension'" Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 3 (Jul. 1989): 451-460.
"[T]here seems to be no intrinsic reason on the British side, even less than on the Australian side, for there to be any cover-up surrounding the British role in Allied intelligence co-operation against Japan in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor."
[WWII/FEPac/Australia & PearlHarbor][c]
Chapman, John W.M. "Russia, Germany and Anglo-Japanese Intelligence Collaboration, 1898-1906." In Russia: War, Diplomacy and Peace: Essays in Honour of John Erickson, eds. Ljubica Erickson and Mark Erickson, 41-55, 308-311. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.
Chapman, John W.M. "Signals Intelligence Cooperation among the Secret Intelligence Services of the Axis States, 1940-41." Japan Forum (1991): 231-256.
[WWII/Eur/Ger & FEPac/Japan]
Chapman, John W.M. "Tricycle Recycled: Collaboration among the Secret Intelligence Services of the Axis States, 1940-41." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1992): 268-299.
This article is somehow passing strange. It includes some interesting Axis-states source materials that "throw light at least on the broader context of the intelligence collaboration, in which Popov [Tricycle] played a very minor role." This is true, but the focus here is on the "context," not on the Tricycle case per se.
Chapman, Robert D. "Lies, Torture, and Humanity." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 188-194.
This is a review article on Goldman, ed., Ethics of Spying (2006), but is worth a read on its own for Chapman's take on a number of related issues.
Chapman, Robert D. "Reflections on Terrorism: A Sideline View." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 207-226.
In commenting on someone's else statement about terrorists, Chapman says, "There's truth to that." The same might be said for this article. Yes, there is truth here, but just how far does the insight of Chapman's "truth" extend? I don't know, but there are some disturbing (meaning disturbing to conventional thinking) thoughts put forward. If that effect was the author's goal, he has achieved it.
Chapman, Robert D. "Remembering the Polish Underground." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 746-752.
The author reviews briefly the CIA's support of the Polish underground organization Wolnosc i Niezawislosc (WiN -- Freedom and Independence) in the early 1950s, as well as events surrounding the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.
[CIA/50s/Gen; OtherCountries/Poland/WWII & CW]
Chapman, Robert D. "You Gotta Know When to Hold." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 221-239.
Although much of this review article concerns Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" (1997), the author also comments on Lyman Kirkpatrick's report on the Bay of Pigs operation. He finds that "[s]ome of what Mr. Kirkpatrick wrote is correct but much is not.... Mr. Kirkpatrick should have known better. That being so, a question of motivation creeps into any critique of his report."
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