Campbell, John P. "D-Day 1943: The Limits of Strategic Deception." Canadian Journal of History 12 (1977): 207-237.
Campbell, John P. "D-Day 1943: The Limits of Strategic Deception." Canadian Journal of History 12 (1977): 207-237.
[WWII?Eur/D-Day]
Campbell, John P.
1. Dieppe Revisited: A Documentary Investigation. Cass Studies in Intelligence Series. London: Frank Cass, 1994.
Clark comment: The ill-fated Dieppe raid was codenamed Operation Jubilee. Greenhous, I&NS 9.4, says that Campbell "conclusively puts to rest the old canard[] that the Germans were ready for the raid as a result of information supplied by an agent.... [He] unpicks nearly all the legends of Dieppe and lays bare the underlying fabric."
2. "The 'Ultra' Revelations: The Dieppe Raid in a New Light as an Example of Now Inevitable Revisions in Second World War Historiography." Canadian Defence Quarterly 6 (Summer 1976): 36-42.
According to Sexton, the author contends that RAF claims of victory over the Luftwaffe during the Dieppe raid "should be reevaluated in light of ULTRA intercepts."
[UK/WWII/Gen]
Campbell, John
P. "Operation Starkey 1943: 'A Piece of Harmless Playacting'? Intelligence
and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987): 92-113.
This article concerns a subsidiary operation, Starkey, of the larger Operation Cockade, designed to "conceal the actual state of Allied weakness in England" in 1943. Starkey was to simulate preparations for an Allied landing in strength on beaches between Boulogne and Le Touquet in early to mid-Sepember 1943.
[WWII/Eur/Deception]
Campbell, John
P. "Roger Hesketh and the de Guingand Letter." Intelligence
and National Security 15, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 131-142.
A letter dated 25 January 1944 from Maj. Gen. "Freddie" de Guingand, Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, to Maj. Gen. C.A. West, of the Operations and Plans Division, SHAEF, "had a decisive and creative influence on the planning process" for Fortitude. But it was Roger Hesketh who "made 'Fortitude South' workable and then saved it."
[WWII/Eur/D-Day]
Campbell, John
P. "Some Pieces of the Ostro Puzzle." Intelligence and National
Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 245-263.
Paul Fidrmuc (Ostro) was an Abwehr agent in Lisbon from the summer of 1940 until March 1945. The question is whether he really had the subagents in Britain and the Middle East that he claimed and whose information the Germans so highly prized, or whether he made it all up.
[WWII/Eur/Ger & Other][c]
Return to Cam