Thomas A. Brooks

Brooks, T[homas] A. [RADM/USN (Ret)] "Did Intelligence Fail Us?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 10 (Oct. 2001): 54-55.

"Intelligence failed not in its inability to predict time and place, but in its inability to think the unthinkable, and to understand the mind-set of the enemy and extrapolate that into warning of what could happen." Bath, NIPQ 18.1, comments that this article provides "a well-considered view of what can reasonably be expected of intelligence and why it failed to deliver" in the case of 11 September 2001.


Brooks, Thomas A. [RADM/USN (Ret)] "Free Edmond Pope." Washington Post, 27 Aug. 2000, B6. []

The following are excerpts from Admiral Brooks' letter on the continued holding in a Russian prison of Edmond Pope: "Mr. Pope is a businessman, not an agent for the U.S. government. He is being held in Moscow's infamous Lefortovo prison without any possibility of bail while the charges are investigated.... Congress and the public should insist that the Clinton administration remember its responsibility to protect the rights of its citizens traveling abroad. It is time for Congress to take a no-nonsense stand with regard to the Russians: Treat American citizens properly or forget any aid or assistance from the United States."


Brooks, Tom [Thomas A.] [RADM/USN (Ret.)] "Grenada -- Operation Urgent Fury: Lessons Learned... Twenty Years Later." Naval Intelligence Professional Quarterly 19, no. 3 (Sep. 2003): 26-27.

The 1983 invasion of Grenada was "limited in scope [and] short in duration.... Yet there were important lessons learned ... and this comparatively insignificant operation had a substantial impact on the creation of joint doctrine, to include joint intelligence and cryptologic doctrine."


Brooks, Thomas A. [Director of Naval Intelligence] "Naval Intelligence in the Nineties." American Intelligence Journal 11, no. 3 (1990): 9-10.


Brooks, Tom [Thomas A.] [RADM/USN (Ret.)]

1. "Part One: Naval Intelligence and the Mafia in World War II." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 2 (Apr. 2007): 39-40.

In this first of a multipart series, Brooks writes on the relationship between the District Intelligence Office (DIO) of the Third Naval District in New York City and organized crime, particularly "Lucky" Luciano, in protecting the Port of New York.

2. "Part Two: Naval Intelligence and the Mafia in World War II." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2007): 17, 19.

Brooks writes about the four volunteers from DIO 3ND who participated in the Mediterranean landings from Sicily through the land campaign. "Their exploits would not have been possible without the contacts provided tham by the New York City Mafia and the local Mafia in Sicily."

3. "Part Three: Naval Intelligence and the Mafia in World War II." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Sep. 2007): 7, 11.

This part of the story "concerns Lucky Luciano and the controversy surrounding his pardon and deportation to Sicily after World War II."


Brooks, Thomas A. [RADM/USN (Ret.)] "Soviet Navy: An Update. Intelligence Collection." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 111, no. 12 (Dec. 1985): 47-49.


Brooks, Tom [Thomas A.] [RADM/USN (Ret)], and Bill Manthorpe [CAPT/USN (Ret)]. "Setting the Record Straight: A Critical Review of Fall from Glory." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 1-2.

Brooks, Tom, and Bill Horn, with Mrs. Veronica Mackay Hulick. "The WAVES, the Bombe, and Camp Sugar." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 21, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 22-24.

Hulick was one of some 300 WAVES assigned to Dayton, Ohio, to operate and care for the Bombes being built at National Cash Register.


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