Brei, William S. Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure. Occasional Paper No. 2. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1996.
Breindel, Eric M. "Do Spies Matter?" Commentary 85 (Mar. 1988): 53-58.
Petersen: "Thoughtful analysis of espionage threat."
Breindel, Eric M., and Herbert Romerstein. The Venona Secrets: The Soviet Union's World War II Espionage Campaign against the United States and How America Fought Back: A Story of Espionage, Counterespionage, and Betrayal. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
According to Peake, NWCR 53.3, this work adds "corroboration to the work of Haynes and Klehr with new documentation and analysis, putting particular emphasis on the role of the Communist Party in Soviet espionage in America."
Breihan, Carl W. Quantrill and His Civil War Guerillas. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1959.
Breitman, Richard. Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998. London: Penguin, 2000. [pb]
According to Michael Smith, "Bletchley Park and the Holocaust," Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 262-274, this work "claims that British codebreakers knew Nazi police operating behind the German troops invading the Soviet Union were murdering thousands of Jews but that they and the British wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who read the messages, did nothing about it." Smith disagrees with Breitman's interpretation and declares that "both the Bletchley Park code breakers and Churchill are innocent of the charges laid against them."
Media stories based on Breitman's book include: James Bone and Michael Binyon, "Britain Accused of Hiding Facts on Holocaust," Times (London), 15 Oct. 1998; Dominic Donald, "Should Churchill Have Acted?" Times (London), 15 Oct. 1998; and Hugo Gordon, "MI6 'Concealed Extermination of Jews for a Year,'" Telegraph (London), 15 Oct. 1998.
Breitman, Richard, and others.
1. Breitman, Richard, and Norman J.W. Goda. Hitler's Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War. Washington, DC: National Archives, 2010. [http://www.archives.gov/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf]
From "Introduction": This report "serves as an addendum to U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis [see below]; it draws upon additional documents declassified since then." The recent declassifications from the CIA included "documents from pre-existing files as well as entirely new CIA files, totaling more than 1,100 files in all.... A much larger collection came from the Army. In the early postwar years, the Army had the largest U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence organizations in Europe; it also led the search for Nazi war criminals." Even after the CIA was established in 1947, "the Army remained a critical factor in intelligence work in central Europe."
2. Breitman, Richard, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 2004. Rev. ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
According to Peake, Studies 49.2 (2005), this work contains 15 articles written by six historians. The contributors use "an impressive mix of secondary and newly released primary sources," and "expand our knowledge on espionage and the holocaust." They deal "with collaborators, and the use of war criminals like Wilhelm Hottl by the Armys Counterintelligence Corps (CIC)." Their documentation supports the conclusion that "some use of Nazis for intelligence purposes did occur." However, "their contemporary perspective ignores the circumstances of the time," leaving readers "wondering about the historical context and priorities that led the politicians and intelligence officers directly involved to make the choices they did."
Friedman, I&NS 20.2 (Jun. 2005), notes that this "collection is not intended for beginners, nor to provide an overview of the issues. These chapters are designed to advance the knowledge of specialists already familiar with the historiography."
For Pendas, H-German, H-Net Reviews, Jun. 2006 [http://www.h-net.org], this "volume is characterized even more than most multi-authored books by the lack of a central narrative or argument.... [It] is driven more by its source material than by any overarching theoretical or historiographical concerns." It "is a book that most readers will likely want to consult for specific questions, rather than for any general conclusions. The fact that, unlike many multi-authored volumes, this one contains an extensive and thorough index is particularly useful in this regard."
Charles Lane, "Book Details U.S. Protection of Former Nazi Officials," Washington Post, 14 May 2004, A2, reports that this book "is based on 240,000 pages of FBI records, 419 CIA files on individuals and 3,000 pages of U.S. Army information detailing the Army's postwar relationship with former officers of the German Wehrmacht's intelligence service."
Bremner, Charles. "French Accuse Gates of Bugging Software." Times (London), 23 Feb. 2000. [http://www.the-times.co.uk]
"French anger over alleged electronic spying by the United States and Britain intensified [on 22 February 2000] with a Defence Ministry report that Microsoft may have collaborated with American intelligence services to bug its Windows software. The claim [was] denied by Microsoft."
1. "Top French Socialist Named as KGB Spy." Times (London), 16 Sep. 1999. [http://www.the-times.co.uk]
On 15 September 1999, Le Monde identified "Claude Estier, the leader of the governing Socialist party in the French Senate and a confidant of the late President Mitterrand,... as one of two high-placed 'agents of influence' cited in the files of the KGB which were smuggled out of Russia by Vasili Mitrokhin."
2. "Paris Shrugs Off Claims of KGB Hand on Its Shoulder." Times (London), 16 Sep. 1999. [http://www.the-times.co.uk]
On 15 September 1999, "[t]he French establishment tried to shrug off claims that the country's civil service, politics and intellectual life had been riddled with Soviet agents throughout the Cold War years. The staff of Senator Claude Estier, identified by Le Monde as a key Soviet informant cited in the Mitrokhin archive, dismissed the affair as 'a hoary old chestnut.'"
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