Benf - Benm

Ben-Hanan, Eli. Our Man in Damascus. Tel Aviv: A.D.M., 1969.

Ben-Israel, Isaac. "Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of Estimate Process." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 660-718.

The author argues that, for intelligence estimates, inductively deriving conclusions from known data is the wrong method. He, then, develops an alternative methodology, based on the scientific method, which he calls the "critical method." The refined critical methodology is used to analyze the intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War (the use of hind-sight is acknowledged here), which he attributes to the use of conventional-inductivist logic.

[Analysis/Estimative & Failures; Israel][c]

Benjamin, Daniel. "A Spymaster Returns Home." Time, 7 Oct. 1991, 35.


Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2002.

Washington Post, 2 Oct. 2002, notes that this book, by two National Security Council staff members during Presidrent Clinton's second term, depicts "a dysfunctional war [with al Qaeda] in which the U.S. effort was crippled by FBI secrecy and thwarted by reluctant bureaucrats in the Justice, Treasury and Defense departments." FBI Director Louis J. Freeh "is depicted ... as a man blinded by animus toward Clinton and manipulated by dishonest reports" from Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan, "who sought to deepen Freeh's rift with the White House."

To Loeb, Washington Post, 16 Dec. 2002, this book "is far more insightful than the [House-Senate] committee's report ... on how government failures contributed to its inability to prevent" the 9/11 suicide attacks. The authors "seem quite balanced in their assessment of the CIA and the Pentagon, faulting each for a certain amount of risk aversion but acknowledging that each took the problem of al Qaeda seriously." They are, however, "unrestrained in their criticism" of the FBI.

Laipson, FA 82.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2003), terms The Age of Sacred Terror an "important new book" that "vividly ... describ[es] how al Qaeda emerged and how America responded." The authors "tell[] us a great deal" about "working on counterterrorism in the U.S. government.... Ultimately, however, theirs is a subjective account and will be matched by those of other players who will want to explain their side of the story."

For Neumann, I&NS 18.4, the authors "provide a solid (albeit hardly groundbreaking) account of the rise of Islamic jihadism, its ideological foundations and current manifestations. More importantly, though, they also offer a fascinating insight into the workings of the American intelligence community in the 1990s." Peake, Studies 48.3 (2004), finds that "[b]y combining history with insights based on current real world experience, the authors have provided a valuable, well-documented perspective on a topic that demands attention."


Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right. New York: Times Books, 2005.

According to Bass, Washington Post, 6 Nov. 2005, the authors "argue that the United States has, in the years since 9/11, frittered away more time than it took to win World War II.... Written in clear and credible prose, The Next Attack is one of the most helpful, challenging goads to serious discussion of terrorism in recent years." However, the work "is stronger on diagnosis than prescription."

Falkenrath, FA 85.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2006), comments that compared with their earlier and good book [The Age of Sacred Terror (2002)], "[t]his effort is a disappointment, less a work of scholarship than a polemic.... The book contains little new research about or analysis of what has happened or what should be done next." The authors respond in FA 85.2 (Mar.-Apr. 2006), commenting that given Falkenrath's background, it is no surprise that he "would loathe a book" critical of the Bush administration's conduct of the war on terrorism. Falkenrath counter-responds in FA 85.2 (Mar.-Apr. 2006), reiterating his view that the book's "scholarship is poor, its information and analysis derivative of more subtle and original works, its assessments unbalanced, and its prescriptions weak."

For Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), the authors do not "appear to realize that the steps they recommend are precisely those now being attempted. Their comment that the intelligence services have not changed their Cold War operational methods is not only unhelpful, it is inaccurate." This book "provides a good summary of the problem but contributes little to the solution."


Benjamin, Jules R. The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.


Benjamin, L.N., comp. The St. Albans Raid: or, Investigation into the Charges. Montreal: John Lovell, 1865. [Petersen]


Ben-Menashe, Ari. Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network. Lanham, MD: Sheridan Square Press, 1992.

Surveillant 3.1 notes that this is more "October Surprise theory." Craig Unger, "The Trouble with Ari," Village Voice, 7 Jul. 1992, 33-39, makes a negative judgment as to Ben-Menashe's truthfulness. On the other hand, NameBase seems to buy into Ben-Menashe's accusations, even the more outrageous ones (such as, "In 1981 Robert Gates helped him with his suitcase containing $56 million").

[GenPostwar/80s/OctSurprise; Israel/U.S.Relations]

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