Bau - Bd

Bauer, Friedrich L. Kryptologie: Methoden und Maximen. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1993. Decrypted Secrets: Methods and Maxims of Cryptology. 4th rev. and extended ed. Berlin: Spinger, 2007.

While noting that the author's reduction of cryptography and cryptanalysis to their mathematical bases makes it "hard for the non-mathematical reader," Kahn, Cryptologia 18.2, calls the original German edition of this work "the best single book now available on the cryptology of today."

Reviewing the fourth English-language edition, Christensen, Cryptologia 31.3 (Jul. 2007), notes that "Bauer's book has become a classic." This new edition "is excellent." However, it "falls short of what one might expect of a cryptology book published in 2007.... A comparable book that includes details of the last twenty years of cryptology should be written."

Krieger, JIH 6.2 (Winter 2006/7), says that "Bauer’s work is partly a great pleasure to read, partly a veritable treasure trove of techniques and of people often completely unknown to the amateur cryptologist." However, "this work was originally written for engineers, not for the mathematically challenged folks in the humanities. So, dear historians, just skip a page here or a table there, but do read on. It is well worth your time!"


Bauer, Karl J. The Mexican War, 1846-1848. New York, Macmillan, 1974.

Petersen: "Good treatment of intelligence aspects."


Bauermeister, Alexander. See A. Agricola.

Baugher, Thomas R. "Swans Swimming in the Sewer: Legal Use of 'Dirty Assets' by CIA." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997): 435-471.

The author uses the March 1995 uproar surrounding the CIA's relationship with Guatemalan Colonel Julio Roberto Alpinez to survey the law and other possible controls over the CIA's use of foreign assets with less than a savory background. He compares some of these issues to those associated with the FBI's use of confidential informants. Baugher concludes that the CIA "must be free to deal with anyone possessing valuable information." However, "Congress must be informed when the asset threatens American lives or interests"; it is, then, up to Congress to "try to pressure the president to forbid a clandestine relationship or terminate an existing one."

[CIA/90s/96/Guat; Overviews/Legal/Topics][c]

Baughman, E.U., and Leonard W. Robinson. Secret Service Chief. New York: Harper & Row, 1961.

Wilcox: "Sympathetic account of the United States Secret Service."


Baumann, Andrea Barbara. "Silver Bullet or Time Suck? Revisiting the Role of Interagency Coordination in Complex Operations." PRISM 3, no. 3 (Jun. 2012): 33-46. []

"The drawdown of American military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to a reduction in the immediate demand for operational civilian-military coordination within the U.S. Government.... The resulting challenge is to design a flexible institutional framework that allows agencies to cooperate effectively if and where needed, while at the same time allowing them to prioritize scarce resources in accordance with distinctly different core mandates and working methods." (Italics in original)


Baumard, Phillippe. "From Noticing to Making Sense: Using Intelligence to Develop Strategy." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 29-73.

Corporate intelligence: individual, organization, and environment.


Baxter, Christopher. "Forgeries and Spies: The Foreign Office and the 'Cicero' Case." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 6 (Dec. 2008): 807-826.

"Cicero was able to bring off a major espionage coup through bad security in the British embassy in Ankara and this was largely [due] to [Ambassador Hughe Knatchbull-] Hugessen's own carelessness.... Although the damage done was probably not very important, the potential danger was enormous."


Baxter, Colin F. The War in North Africa, 1940-1943: A Selected Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996.

Tate, Air & Space Power Journal (2008), enthuses that this is a "magnificent treasure of information for the would-be historian.... A well-written, thought-provoking historical synopsis of the desert war precedes the selected bibliography.... The presentation of this book is ideal. Its information is accessible and easy to extract. The author's methodology is clear and concise."

[UK/WWII/NAf; WWII/Refmats]

Baxter, James P., III. Scientists Against Time. Boston: Little, Brown, 1946. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1948. [pb]

Winner of the 1947 Pulitzer Prize for History by the official historian of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) during World War II.

[GenPostwar/Issues/S&T; WWII/FEPac/Bomb]

Bayandor, Darioush. Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited. London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2010.

For Goulden, Washington Times, 16 Aug. 2010, and Intelligencer 18.1 (Fall-Winter 2010), "there is a very thin element of truth" in the author's revisionist theory that the overthrow of Mossaddeq resulted primarily from internal Iranian dynamics, not the actions of the CIA and MI6. However, Bayandor "glides over the fact that the [Iranian] military did not stir until the CIA/SIS action."

Peake, Studies 54.4 (Dec. 2010), notes the author's acknowledgement that "the failure of the CIA plan codenamed TPAJAX [scheduled for 15-16 August 1953] 'set off a chain reaction which led to the ... Mosaddeq downfall,' but its role, he argues, was indirect." He implies that the coup would eventually have occurred without the CIA/MI6 intervention.


Baylor, George. Bull Run to Bull Run. 1900. Washington, DC: Zenger, 1983.

Tidwell, April '65, pp. 174, 175, 184, associates Baylor's mission at Arundels' on 10 April 1865 with an effort to insert Harney into Washington, DC, for a covert action involving explosives.


Bayly, Christopher Alan.

1. Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

MacMillan, AHR 103.4, finds that Bayly's work goes well beyond a discussion of British intelligence and surveillance of their Indian subjects. Rather, this is "a wide-ranging and subtle exploration of systems of knowledge and how these affect, and are affected by, the relations between rulers and ruled." For Durrans, English Historical Review, Nov. 1998, this is an "absorbing and persuasive study" that "offers valuable insights."

2. "Knowing the Country: Empire and Information in India'. Modern Asian Studies 27 (1993): 3-43.


Bazan, Elizabeth B.

Bazna, Elyesa, with Hans Nogly. I Was Cicero. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. New York: Dell, 1964. [pb]

Pforzheimer says that Bazna presents an "interesting account," but I Was Cicero should "be read ... with Moyzisch's Operation Cicero."




BDM Corporation. A Historical Survey of Counter-C3. McLean, VA: 27 Apr. 1979.

Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), notes that Counter-C3 (command, control, communications) means deception. The study's data comes from 13 case studies ranging across several centuries. BDM was a beltway defense contractor, and its study "was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency."


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