Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. "An Insight into the Mindset of Iraq's Security Apparatus." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 1-23.
Working from documents captured in the 1991 Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq and transferred to the United States, the author concludes that "the mindset of the Iraqi security apparatus is preoccupied with justifying its actions, through a discourse designed to discredit enemies of the state and their activities, at the same time to glorify the actions of the regime against its foes."
Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. "The Family, Clan, and Tribal Dynamics of Saddam's Security and Intelligence Network." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 202-211.
This article reviews the "five primary agencies making up the Iraqi security apparatus.... Along with the Special Republican Guard, they form a vast, complex, and wide-ranging labyrinth of security organizations, with mutually independent intelligence and military units."
Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. "Iraqi Intelligence Operations and Objectives in Turkey." Alternatines: Turkish Journal of International Relations 2, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 78-94.
Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis." Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 3 (Sep. 2002).
Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. "Saddam's Security Apparatus during the Invasion of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti Resistance." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 2 (Winter 2003). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]
From abstract: When Iraq prepared to invade Kuwait in August 1990, the Iraqi security apparatus was "assigned to infiltrate every layer of Kuwaiti society. Hussein tasked these agencies with protecting the regime and state from internal threats posed by the Kuwaiti resistance. The existence of a local resistance posed a tactical military threat as well as a symbolic one."
Almond, Mark. "Still Serving Secretly: Soviet Bloc Spies Under New Masters." Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, Occasional Papers, no. 57 (1992).
Almond, Peter. "Special Operations Forces Ask Free Rein on Covert Jobs." Washington Times, 12 Apr. 1990, A4.
Petersen: "Intelligence for anti-terrorist and other tactical activities."
1. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam -- The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965. Rev. ed. New York: Penguin, 1985. [pb] 2d expanded ed. UK: Pluto Press, 1994. [pb] New York: Vintage, 1996. [pb]
Clark comment: This work is a revision of the author's PhD thesis at Cambridge University. It has been and remains a highly controversial piece of revisionist history. The author argues that in 1945 Japan was already defeated and the United States did not have to use the atomic bomb in order to win the war. In Alperovitz' view, it did so in an attempt to intimidate the Soviet Union. For a highly critical review, see Robert James Maddox, "Atomic Diplomacy: A Study in Creative Writing," Journal of American History 59, no. 4 (1973): 925-934.
2. "The Big Lie: Why the West Really Bombed Japan." The Listener, 10 Aug. 1989.
3. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of the American Myth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.
Auer and Halloran, Parameters (Spring 1996), note that this is "a long and thoroughly documented work.... The author condemns the President for having acted illegally, self-servingly overestimating the number of American lives saved, and misrepresenting Hiroshima and Nagasaki as military targets."
For Giangreco, Parameters (Autumn 1999), this is simply a recapitulation of Atomic Diplomacy and "adds little new to the mix except redundancies, extraneous material, and a generous amount of smoke. The author's willingness to misrepresent or ignore documents that do not support his thesis is particularly troublesome."
Alpert, Sheri. "Total Information Awareness -- Forgotten But Not Gone: Lessons for Neuroethics." American Journal of Bioethics 7, no. 5 (2007): 24-26.
DARPA's Total Information Awareness (TIA) did not really disappear when Congress cancelled its funding. "[M]any of the projects that comprised TIA were moved" to such agencies as NSA's Advanced Research and Development Activity. "In other words, the programs not only survived the attempt to eliminate them by Congress, but worse, they were transferred to the 'black' (classified) budget, where they continue beyond public scrutiny." This precedent is a cause for concern.
Alsop, J. D. "British Intelligence for the North Atlantic Theatre of the War of Spanish Succession." Mariner's Mirror 77 (1991): 113-118.
Alsop, Joseph W., with Adam Platt. "I've Seen the Best of It": Memoirs. New York: Norton, 1992.
Surveillant 2.4: The author "knew what CIA was up to in many places ... and had close ties to many senior figures in CIA in its early days.... The book's principal weakness lies in the author's too golden view of the Kennedy administration." Alsop includes a section on "CIA relations with press." See also, Yoder, Joe Alsop's Cold War (1995).
[CIA/Relations/Media; GenPostwar/50s & 60s]
Alsop, Stewart. The Center: People and Power in Political Washington. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
Petersen: "Useful information on intelligence officials and episodes."
[GenPostwar/50s & 60s]
Alsop, Stewart. "CIA, the Battle for Secret Power." Saturday Evening Post, 27 Jul. 1963, 17-21. [Petersen]
Alsop, Stewart. "The Lessons of the Cuban Disaster." Saturday Evening Post, 24 Jun. 1961, 26-27 ff. [Petersen]
Alsop, Stewart, and Thomas Braden. Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964. [pb]
Pforzheimer notes that this book contains "fragmentary but authentic examples of a few OSS clandestine and paramilitary operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia." According to Constantinides, "a few OSS operations and missions are outlined in True Adventure style. The ... operations covered are not significant in themselves because subsequent writings have offered much more."
Altavilla, Enrico. The Art of Spying. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967. London: Hale, 1968.
Constantinides sees the author alternating "little-known facts and trenchant observations with erroneous and even preposterous ones." This book "could serve as an end-of-course assignment on post-World War II espionage in which students are assigned the task of identifying errors in the text."
Altbach, P.G. "Spies for CIA or Deserving Students?" Christian Century 15 (Mar. 1967): 352-354. [Petersen]
Altenhöner, Florian. "SS-Intelligence, Covert Operations and the Slovak Declaration of Independence in March 1939." Journal of Intelligence History 8, no. 2 (Winter 2008-2009). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
Altenhöner, Florian. "Total War -- Total Control? German Military Intelligence on the Home Front, 1914-1918." Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 2 (Winter 2005). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
From abstract: "Although the German General Staff had intensified its intelligence activities prior to 1914, its preparations for war proved to be insufficient after the beginning of the war. Before the war, Department IIIb of the General Staff had almost exclusively dealt with espionage and counter-espionage. By ... 1918 it also was a political police, a censorship and propaganda authority, [and] it issued identity cards and organized postal censorship."
Alterman, Eric. "The CIA's Fifty Candles." Nation, 6 Oct. 1997, 5-6.
Seymour: "Editorial about the CIA on its fiftieth anniversary discusses its search for a reason to exist now that the cold war has ended."
Alterman, Eric. "A View to a Kill." Rolling Stone, 23 Mar. 1995, 48- 54.
Questions need for incurring continuing cost of CIA in a world where information is so readily available.
Alvarez, David - A-R
Alvarez, David - S-Z
Alvarez, Lizette. "Spying on Terrorists and Thwarting Them Gains New Urgency." New York Times, 14 Sep. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"Hoping to prevent future terrorist attacks, House and Senate lawmakers expressed broad support [on 13 September 2001] for funneling more money to intelligence operations, beefing up spy networks and creating one agency to handle terrorism."
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