A - L

Allen, Bobby [CWO2]. "The New Counterintelligence Response to the Cyberthreat." Military Intelligence (Jul.-Sep. 2003): 32-35.

"U.S. counterintelligence (CI) elements must refocus to defend against the rapidly expanding cyberintelligence collection threat.... The greatest threat is from trusted insiders with placement and access to highly sensitive classified information. It is a relatively simple task to plug in a miniature datastorage device and save hundreds of megabytes of classified data they can easily smuggle out."


[Allen, Charles.] "Remarks by Charles Allen, Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, 13 February 2008." CIRA Newsletter 33, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 3-9.

"We did not have an intelligence architecture when I arrived [at DHS] and that's where I've spent most of my effort over the last two years: defining that architecture and then building an intelligence cadre that can respond to and prepare the kind of products the Department and all its operating components need."


[Allen, Charles E.] "[Prepared remarks:] Testimony of Charles E. Allen before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment." Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security Press Release, 24 Sep. 2008. []

"My task as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department has been to lead the effort to develop the vision for, design the architecture of, and implement a comprehensive homeland security intelligence program that is fully integrated into the traditional Intelligence Community but which equally reaches out to new, essential partners at all levels of government and within the private sector."


Allen, Charles E. "Warning and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: A Retrospective Look." Defense Intelligence Journal 7, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 33-44.

The author is Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection and was NIO for Warning at the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. He offers specific examples of the clear warnings issued from his staff at the time. These warnings were not heeded by senior intelligence officials or policymakers.


Allen, Craig H. "The Limits of Intelligence in Maritime Counterproliferation Operations." Naval War College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 35-52.

"The long-term practical and political success of the Proliferation Security Initiative will be determined in large measure by the availability of timely and accurate intelligence, and by whether decision makers and operators are more willing to err on the side of safety or caution."


Allen, Deane J. "Reviewing the Literature: Intelligence Is Organization." Defense Intelligence Journal 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 113-120.

"The evolution of intelligence beyond its early rudimentary forms ... depended upon organizational innovation and resiliency." Works mentioned include Schwien, Kent, Dulles, Hilsman, Cline, Godson, Berkowitz and Goodman, and Shulsky.


Allen, Gary W., and Anthony J. Ramienski. "A Survey of Intelligence Literature." Military Intelligence 12, no. 2 (1986): 54-56.


Allen, George V. "Propaganda: A Conscious Weapon of Diplomacy." Department of State Bulletin 21 (19 Dec. 1949): 941-943. [Petersen]


Allen, George W. None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001.

Cohen, FA 81.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2002), notes that the author was "a leading intelligence analyst, who worked on Vietnam from 1949 through 1968." It is not surprising that he "vindicates positions taken by the CIA and is scathing about many U.S. military leaders." A Publisher's Weekly, 18 Jun. 2001, reviewer calls this a "wide-ranging, illuminating memoir.... Allen makes a strong case that the 'failure' of the book's subtitle was not one of misreported or incorrect analysis; it was of not being able to convince the [various] administrations that they were pursuing the wrong course."

To Peake, JIH 4.2, this book "is one of the most important accounts of intelligence in [the] Vietnam war even though it does not have source citations." Peake, Studies 47.3 (2003), adds that "Robert McNamara's role gets the attention it so richly deserves and the Sam Adams order-of-battle numbers controversy is treated with fairness.  If the reader can only read one book about the problems of strategic intelligence in Vietnam, make it None So Blind." Whaley, Bibliography of Counterdeception (2006), agrees with the latter opinion, terming Allen's a "perceptive and scathing account of the rampant political and personal distortions and indeed outright PR fakery of intelligence during the Vietnam War."

Moise, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, Jul. 2002 [], states that despite "occasional defects, George Allen has produced one of the best and most informative memoirs this reviewer has seen. It has very sophisticated analysis, and many interesting details, about what actually happened in Vietnam during the period covered. It also says much about how the events were understood and discussed in Washington." James J. Wirtz, "Reflections on a Lost War," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 460-463, presents some thoughts on Allen and his relationship to the Vietnam War.

[CIA/Memoirs; Vietnam/Analysis]

Allen, George W. “The Professionalization of Intelligence.” Studies in Intelligence 26, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 23-31. “The Professionalization of Intelligence.” In Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application, 2d ed., eds. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodden, 33-40. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, 1995.

"Sherman Kent and others hailed the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency as symbolizing the maturing of intelligence as a profession. Yet, almost thirty-five years later, we find many of those engaged in the vocation of intelligence ignoring or neglecting the implications of its professionalization."


Allen, Henry. "J. Edgar Hoover's Fall from Fashion: It's Been a Long Slide from National Hero to Devil in a Black Dress." WPNWE, 29 Mar.-4 Apr. 1993, 10-11.


Allen, Lewis. "Japanese Intelligence Systems." Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 4 (Oct. 1987): 547-561.

Sexton calls this article "a balanced account of Japanese Intelligence organizations." The author's "discussion of the Owada Sigint unit is especially enlightening."

[WWII/FEPac/Japan; OtherCountries/Japan/PostWWII]

Allen, Lewis. Singapore 1941-1942. London: Davis-Poynter, 1977. Rev. ed. London: Frank Cass, 1995.


Allen, Louis. "Burmese Puzzles: Two Deaths that Never Were." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 193-198.

This article concerns the reported deaths of two Japanese generals by Burmese guerrilla forces. The author believes the deaths never occurred.


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